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CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARATIVISM:  THE 
EMERGING RISK OF COMPARATIVE LAW AS 
A CONSTITUTIONAL TIEBREAKER  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
During Justice Samuel Alito’s confirmation hearings on January 1, 
2006, following his nomination to the Supreme Court, Senator Jon Kyl 
asked him what he believed the proper role is for foreign laws in 
Supreme Court decisions.1  Leading up to this question, Senator Kyl 
discussed the case of Roper v. Simmons, which ruled unconstitutional any 
state law that provided for the execution of minors.2  The central 
question in Roper was whether the Eighth Amendment of the 
Constitution barred capital sentences against juveniles under its 
standard that forbids cruel and unusual punishments.3  The traditional 
test used by the Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of 
human rights issues such as the death penalty was to identify an 
overwhelming national consensus, signified by state laws, that marks 
evolving standards of decency in America.4   
However, as pointed out in Senator Kyl’s question, the Roper opinion 
devoted approximately twenty percent of its text to a discussion of how 
foreign laws dealt with the juvenile death penalty.5  Senator Kyl stated 
that he believed reliance on foreign law is contrary to America’s 
constitutional traditions, undermines democratic self-government, is 
“utterly impractical,” and is needlessly disrespectful to the American 
people.6  Justice Alito responded by voicing his opinion that foreign law 
is not helpful in interpreting the Constitution, and provided multiple 
reasons why he believed so.7  Specifically, Justice Alito argued that the 
                                                 
1 U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Justice Samuel Alito’s Nomination to the 
Supreme Court; Part I of III,  Washingtonpost.com, Jan. 10, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 
689847 [hereinafter Alito Hearings].  Senator Kyl informed Justice Alito that he was just 
repeating the same question that he had asked then Judge Roberts only a few months 
before he was confirmed as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  Id. 
2 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
3 Id.  This standard is discussed more fully infra Parts II.C.2-II.C.3. 
4 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192. 
5 Alito Hearings, supra note 1.  Senator Kyl noted that the Court referenced foreign laws 
from the countries of Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran, Nigeria and China.  Id.  He 
also noted that Justice Breyer’s opinion in Knight v. Florida similarly referenced the laws of 
Zimbabwe, India, Jamaica, and Canada in arguing that the Constitution considers a delay 
caused by a convicted murderer’s repeated appeals a cruel and unusual punishment.  Id.; 
see Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999). 
6 Alito Hearings, supra note 1. 
7 Id.  Justice Alito also mentioned that some references, such as when a case deals with 
treaty interpretation, are acceptable, but foreign law should not be used to interpret the 
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United States Constitution should be independent from foreign law 
because it has unique traditions, and precedents, and that courts should 
consider those factors exclusively.8   
This controversial issue presented to Justice Alito is not new to the 
Supreme Court.9  As Senator Kyl stated, the main question concerns 
which foreign sources are appropriate for American legal interpretation.  
The three main conflicts leading to foreign law references are in cases 
involving treaty law, cross-border issues, and purely domestic issues.10  
Most of the controversy centers around decisions like Roper, which 
concern domestic issues only, and the multiple criticisms look to history, 
tradition, and constitutional theory for support.11  In the end, many 
scholars agree with Senator Kyl—that United States courts should not 
use foreign law to interpret the Constitution because it threatens 
democracy by thwarting the will of the American people.12  Others argue 
that using foreign law to interpret the Constitution risks erroneous 
rulings through selective and haphazard use of foreign authority.13  Still, 
other critics defend the practice, arguing that comparative references are 
similar to citing a treatise, an individual’s speech, or looking to the 
effects of a particular state law.14  These scholars also argue that 
generally citing foreign law helps foreign policy by demonstrating 
comity with other nations.15   
As can be seen from these arguments, many important issues must 
be reconciled.  The Court needs a methodology to separate the 
potentially harmful cases from the harmless cases.  Once singled out, 
only a few cases represent a potential threat to American jurisprudence.  
Specifically, the class of cases involving purely domestic issues that cite 
to foreign law simply to support the Court’s value judgments present a 
slippery slope that risks circumventing the democratic process, whereas 
the majority of the cases utilizing comparative law are no different from 
any other persuasive source.   
                                                                                                             
Constitution.  Id.  For a more in-depth discussion of this and other arguments against this 
practice, see infra Part II.D.2. 
8 Alito Hearings, supra note 1. 
9 See infra Part II.C for a synopsis of the Courts’ history with foreign legal references. 
10 See infra Parts II.A-II.B. 
11 All of these theories are discussed infra Part II.D. 
12 See infra Part II.D.2. 
13 See infra Part II.B. 
14 See infra Part II.A. 
15 See infra Part II.A. 
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This Note first provides a background to comparative judicial 
practice in Part II.16  It identifies the decisions that are generally 
uncontroversial, and further distinguishes the most controversial 
decisions.17  Second, Part II provides a history of Supreme Court 
comparative references, and summarizes the contemporary arguments 
surrounding the issue.18  Part III provides a careful analysis of the issues 
arising from Part II, while Part IV lays out Model Judicial Reasoning for 
determining when comparative analysis is appropriate.19   
II.  A HISTORY OF COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
The fundamental principle guiding comparative law is that the laws 
of all nations are comparable on one level or another.20  It follows that 
comparative reasoning exists where any domestic legal reasoning refers 
to a foreign legal concept.21  This may occur in all forums, from scholarly 
writings to a nation’s legislature.22  This Note focuses on the numerous 
instances where comparative reasoning occurs in American legal 
interpretation by the judiciary.23  Scholars often refer to this practice as 
“judicial internationalism.”24  Recently, in Roper v. Simmons,25 this 
practice raised considerable controversy, where the Supreme Court 
referenced multiple sources of international law to determine the 
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty.26  However, cases like 
                                                 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See infra Parts II.A-II.B. 
18 See infra Parts II.C-II.D. 
19 See infra Parts III-IV.  In Part III.A, this Note asserts that many arguments for and 
against comparative judicial practice can be satisfied by simply separating the issues of the 
particular case and viewing the case in its correct context.  Part III.B then looks at cases 
involving purely domestic issues, while Part IV provides a solution to the issues and 
problems that arise in Part III. 
20 H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Law and Legal Practice: On Removing the Borders, 75 TUL. 
L. REV. 977, 1002 (2001).  Comparative law is “[t]he scholarly study of the similarities and 
differences between the legal systems of different jurisdictions, such as between civil-law 
and common-law countries.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (8th ed. 2004). 
21 Jens C. Dammann, The Role of Comparative Law in Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 513, 519 (2002). 
22 Id. at 520-22 (analyzing the various ways in which the legal community uses 
comparative law). 
23 See infra Parts II.A-II.B. 
24 Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case Against Judicial Internationalism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 185, 216 
(2005).  “Judicial Internationalism” has multiple titles.  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (referring to judicial 
internationalism as “transjudicial communication”). 
25 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
26 See infra Part II.C.3.b for an in-depth discussion of Roper v. Simmons, and infra Part 
II.C.2 for a greater explanation of the controversy behind this type of decision.  For other, 
more recent articles discussing Roper, see Marcia Coyle, Foreign Law is Key in Juvenile Capital 
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Roper are unique, and after distinguishing between the three classes of 
cases that use comparative analyses—those involving treaties, 
international law, and purely domestic issues—it becomes apparent that 
only a small class of cases pose any new threat to American 
jurisprudence.27  Specifically, the class of cases involving purely 
domestic issues that cite to foreign law simply to support the Court’s 
value judgments represent a slippery slope that risks potential 
circumvention of the democratic process.28 
Part II.A of this Note looks at the two non-disputed classes of cases 
where the Court invokes comparative reasoning, followed by an 
explanation of a third area, purely domestic law, that has recently raised 
substantial controversy.29  Next, Part II.B engages in a historical analysis 
of the Court’s use of comparative reasoning. 30  Finally, Part II.C lays out 
the contemporary arguments for and against judicial internationalism.31  
A.  Two Non-Disputed Classes of Cases  
The Supreme Court has historically used foreign legal sources in 
three types of cases:  (1) cases involving treaties; (2) cases under 
American domestic law that involve cross-border issues; and (3) cases 
dealing with purely domestic issues.32  In all three types of cases, the 
judiciary may only use foreign legal sources as persuasive authority or it 
                                                                                                             
Case Justices Split over Non-U.S. Law’s Role, 27 NAT’L L.J., Oct. 2004, at 6; Jonathan Gurwitz, If 
It Pleases the Court, Law by Consensus, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Mar. 13, 2005; Donna Walter, 
Law Professors Dissect U.S. Supreme Court’s Recent Term, DAILY RECORD, July 13, 2005. 
27 See infra Part II.B. 
28 See infra Parts II.A-II.B; see also Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. 
Constitution, POL’Y REV. NO. 131, June & July 2005, at 1 n.2, available at http://www.policy 
review.org/jun05/anderson.html (noting that only the notes dealing with constitutional 
questions pose a real controversial question). 
29 See infra Part II.A-II.B.  These three scenarios are primarily borrowed from Sanchez, 
supra note 24. 
30 See infra Part II.B; see also infra notes 74-75 (explaining these time periods further). 
31 See infra Part II.C. 
32 See supra note 24. Scholars use many classifications for explaining judicial comparative 
analysis.  One such classification frequently referenced is public versus private 
international law.  See Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the 
Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 362 (2005).  Public 
international law, or simply international law, is law dealing with a pure international 
dispute between nations, whereas private international law is law dealing with the conflict 
of laws.  Id.  The result in this case is the same—public international law is comparable to 
law over treaties and any direct issue of international law.  Id.  Private international law is 
equivalent to laws that have international implications or conflicting interests.  Id.  Further, 
some categories focus on utility of judicial internationalism, such as empirical or 
expository.  These classifications are discussed in detail infra Part II.B. 
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risks circumventing the democratic system.33  Thus, the risk behind 
judicial internationalism increases when the judiciary puts foreign 
sources on an equal footing with other mandatory authority.34  The level 
of controversy varies depending on the jurisdictional implications 
behind each particular case, and the amount of influence the source has 
on a court’s decision.35  As a result, the third line of cases, those citing 
foreign law in purely domestic deliberations, raises considerable 
controversy simply because the foreign sources receive undue weight 
when the case lacks a tangible international significance.36  Although the 
first two types of cases do not generally raise controversy for their 
foreign references, it is important to distinguish them because they are 
often confused with the purely domestic cases.37 
1. Cases Involving Treaties  
One commonly referenced Supreme Court case looking to foreign 
legal principles to interpret treaties is Air France v. Saks.38  Air France 
involved a dispute over the interpretation of certain terms in the Warsaw 
                                                 
33 See infra Part II.D.2.  Persuasive authority is authority that has no binding legal 
precedent on the court; rather, the judges use it as an aid in interpreting a legal standard of 
the United States.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at  795.  Mandatory authority 
(or imperative authority) is that which the courts must follow, such as the Constitution.  Id. 
34 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 199 
(2003) (tracing the increasing use of international law as persuasive authority in a section 
titled “The Rise of Persuasive Authority”).  Although the Court has not done this explicitly, 
recent decisions have arguably used comparative references as more mandatory authority.  
See infra Part II.B.3. 
35 Dammann, supra note 21, at 520-22. 
36 See infra Part IV. 
37 See infra Parts II.A-II.B.  As an example, one report printed in the Chicago Daily Bulletin 
confused the issue considerably.  Steve Lash, High Court Cites to Foreign Law Irk Scalia, CHIC. 
DAILY BULL., July 22, 2004, at 1.  After a brief synopsis of Scalia’s “scold[ing] [of] the 
[C]ourt” in his dissent, the journalist incorrectly accused him of being hypocritical.  Id.  As 
proof, the journalist pointed out how in the past term Scalia had 
“[i]ronically . . . reproached his colleagues for their refusal to defer to the rulings of foreign 
courts in one case.”  Id.  That case, Olympic Airways v. Husain, 541 U.S. 1007 (2004), involved 
a liability claim against an air carrier under the Warsaw Convention, a treaty in which the 
United States is a signatory.  Id.  In short, by using a case dealing 100% with a treaty issue 
as an example of the Court’s comparative practice, this journalist attempts to justify further 
comparative practice in purely domestic constitutional questions.  Thus he asserts that 
there is no difference between using comparative legal materials to interpret a treaty that 
actually involves a foreign signatory, and using those same materials to interpret the 
Constitution. 
38 470 U.S. 392 (1985).  A woman sued Air France under the Warsaw Convention 
alleging that she became permanently deaf because of the negligent maintenance and 
operation of aircraft’s pressurization system.  Id. at 391. 
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Convention.39  Because no American case or other reference to the 
Convention existed on point, the majority looked to France’s and other 
signatories’ interpretations of the disputed terms in their translation of 
the treaty.40  The Court stated that when interpreting treaties, not only is 
it appropriate to refer to the treaties’ drafting records and negotiations, 
but also to grant considerable weight to the interpretations of “sister 
signatories.”41   
Since it is the “sister signatories” that courts reference in treaty 
disputes, little controversy exists because of the obvious interest those 
signatories share.42  Also, because treaties are laws shared with foreign 
countries, United States courts should necessarily look to those 
countries’ interpretations to assure a fair application of the treaty and 
provide deference to all signatories.43  In contrast to disputes that involve 
purely domestic constitutional issues, a court’s treaty interpretation must 
be in step with interpretations of other nations in order to assure a fair 
application of the treaty, a task solely in the federal government’s 
jurisdiction, which poses no threat to American democracy.44  The next 
line of cases is similarly situated.45 
                                                 
39 Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation 
by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876, reprinted at 49 U.S.C. § 
40105 (2000) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. The Warsaw Convention makes air carriers 
liable for injuries sustained by a passenger “‘if the accident which caused the damage so 
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of 
embarking or disembarking.’”  Air France, 470 U.S. at 394-95. The case turned on the 
definition of the word “accident.” Id. at 395.  The discovery process revealed that the 
airplane’s pressure system was working properly the entire flight, thus the airline was not 
negligent.  Id.  The plaintiff asserted that any injury occurring on the plane should be 
considered an accident, and the airline maintained that it was not liable for accidents when 
it was not negligent.  Id.  Thus, in its deliberations the Court looked at the interpretations 
that other signatories gave to the word “accident” to find that the carrier was not at fault.  
Id. 
40 Air France, 470 U.S. at 398-401. 
41 Id. at 404. 
42 Sanchez, supra note 24, at 10-11, 13. 
43 Id.  Even Justice Scalia, the Court’s foremost critic of judicial internationalism, agrees 
that judges should look to the treaty interpretation of other signatories.  See Full Written 
Transcript of Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/ 
f-news/1352357/posts (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) [hereinafter Scalia-Breyer Debate].  Other 
cases invoking treaty issues where the Court uses comparative analysis include Olympic 
Airways v. Husain, 541 U.S. 1007 (2005); El Al Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 
(1999); Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991). 
44 Sanchez, supra note 24, at 10-11, 13. 
45 See infra Part II.A.2 
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2.  Questions of International Law 
One famous case concerning a dispute under American law, but 
invoking cross-border interests, is The Paquete Habana.46  Here, the Court 
had no statute, treaty, or case law on point, so it turned to the rules of 
customary international law.47  As justification, the Court noted that 
international law is America’s law, and it is worth tracing the laws 
through history, not only as applied in the United States, but also 
throughout the “civilized” world.48  The Court proceeded to quote 
statements made by King Henry IV, French writers during the American 
Revolutionary War, and Japan.49  In the end, these diverse sources did 
not directly govern The Paquete Habana decision, but rather served as a 
persuasive guide for identifying a relevant customary international law 
practice as it applies in the United States.50  Again, because international 
law issues are solely the federal government’s task, and because of the 
large impact these decisions have on international law, state rights are 
not abrogated by looking abroad, and democracy is not threatened.51  As 
shown in the next line of cases, some decisions that lack this 
international legal significance face a more serious risk because of their 
potential infringement on state’s rights.52  
                                                 
46 175 U.S. 677 (1900).  In The Paquete Habana, the plaintiffs sued for compensation after 
the war-time seizure of their fishing vessels.  Id. at 679.  The American government 
considered the boats a “prize of war,” but the owners of the boats sued for the cost of the 
ships because they were not involved in the war.  Id.  The two vessels were auctioned off 
for $490 and $800 respectively, thus the plaintiff only sought money damages for the loss of 
the ship and cargo.  Id. 
47 Id. at 694.  Customary international law is analogous to common law, but on an 
international scale.  It is somewhat elusive, but is generally defined by the customary 
international practices of states and their acceptance to be legally bound by those practices.  
For an in-depth discussion of customary international law, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. 
Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999). 
48 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686.  The Court also noted that international law is part 
of America’s law, and must be ascertained by American courts.  Id. at 700.  “For this 
purpose[,]” the Court wrote, “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of 
[c]ivilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators” of 
foreign nations.  Id. at 700 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64, 214-15 (1895)). 
49 Id. at 687-700. 
50 See Sanchez, supra note 24, at 16. 
51 See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 (1840) (finding that U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10 
prohibited states from entering into agreements with foreign governments). 
52 See infra Part II.B. 
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B. The Controversy:  Cases Involving Purely Domestic Issues     
Professor Joan Larsen has separated cases concerning purely 
domestic issues into three categories:  expository, empirical, and 
substantive. 53  Expository references are those that use comparative legal 
materials to explain a domestic law in America.54  Empirical references 
are used to examine the practical effect of a law on a certain situation.55  
A substantive reference seeks international guidance to define the 
content of a domestic rule.56  Larsen further splits substantive references 
into “moral fact-finding” or “reason borrowing” decisions, which occur 
when the Court looks simply to the fact that a country has adopted a 
specific rule to justify conformity to that rule.57  All of these references 
can be positive, upholding foreign law as applied to American law, or 
negative, rejecting the application of, or distinguishing a foreign law.58  
                                                 
53 Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: Lawrence 
and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional 
Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 (2004). 
54 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1288. One example Larsen gives is in Raines v. Byrd, where the 
Court discusses that many foreign laws reached a contrary result to the Supreme Court’s 
finding that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the dilution of their votes 
brought by the Line Item Veto Act.  521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
55 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1289.  In Washington v. Glucksberg,  the Court used empirical 
references by analyzing the practical effect that laws enforcing physician assisted suicide 
had on the Netherlands.  521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) 
(involving a state’s importation of live baitfish); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) 
(rejecting the state’s suggestion that subjecting peremptory challenges to equal protection 
standards would create serious administrative difficulties); Smith v. California,  361 U.S. 
147, 152-55 (1959). 
56 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1291. 
57 Id. at 1291-94.  One example of the reason-borrowing approach is illustrated in Smith 
v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).  Moral fact-finding is very similar to a consensus, where 
the Court looks to a world consensus on an issue in order to reach a decision.  Larsen, supra 
note 53, at 1291.  For a discussion of multiple cases invoking the moral fact-finding 
approach, see infra Part II.C.3.  The other type of substantive reference Larsen refers to is 
called “reason-borrowing,” where the Court looks to foreign judicial opinions that address 
similar questions of law, and uses the reasoning to shape domestic law.  Larsen, supra note 
53, at 1287-88.  The “reason-borrowing” approach was not used during the Rehnquist 
Court.  Id. 
58 Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 82, 84-89 (2004).  Neuman explains that the positive use of foreign law involves: 
(1) a consensual “positive” basis of a right; (2) a “suprapositive” aspect, of a right 
independent from other law; and (3) an institutional aspect that facilitates compliance 
within the relevant legal system. Id. at 84-85.  This is comparable to instances where the 
courts use negative inferences to international law.  Id.  Negative inferences are those 
which distinguish American law from foreign law and does not follow its example.  See 
Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 
698-99 (2005) [hereinafter Alford, In Search of a Theory] (citing to multiple cases that “used 
comparative empiricism negatively to warn against extreme responses of totalitarian 
regimes to curtail civil liberties”). 
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Thus, the controversy of a particular case depends on the role a 
particular source plays in the Court’s decision.59  Although criticism of 
constitutional comparativism in these cases is fairly modern, the issue is 
not new.60   
One early example is the 1884 case of Hurtado v. California,61 
involving a challenge to the indictment process as violating Due Process 
Clause.62  The Court looked to the Magna Carta in its opinion, stating that 
a characteristic practice of common law was to draw inspiration from all 
                                                 
59 Supra notes 53-58. 
60 See infra Part II.C for a detailed analysis of constitutional comparativism throughout 
America’s history.  The Declaration of Independence shows one of America’s earliest 
recorded references encouraging the use of comparative law where it states that the new 
republic would exhibit a “decent respect for the opinions of mankind.”  THE DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (U.S. 1776).  As will be discussed in Part III.A, scholars and 
judges alike frequently cite to this quotation in their support for judicial internationalism.  
See Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”:  The 
Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Apr. 1, 2005), 
http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401.html [hereinafter Ginsburg’s 
Address] (speech to The American Society of International Law); see also Daniel Bodansky, 
The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 421, 421 
(2004). 
 The Declaration of Independence does not indicate which country’s laws count, or 
whether foreign law should influence the judiciary as well as the legislature.  Glensy, supra 
note 32, at 364.  Nevertheless, it does suggest that the Drafters indicated a positive attitude 
towards the laws of foreign nations on a policy basis.  Id.  The controversy surrounding 
judicial internationalism has slowly emerged as the Court tests these issues by using 
foreign sources as authority to help decide cases involving no implications outside of 
America’s domestic law.  See infra Part II.C (providing contemporary criticisms of 
Constitutional Comparativism).  The most disputed occurrences of judicial 
internationalism are when the Court uses comparative sources to interpret the 
Constitution.  Anderson, supra note 28 (arguing against comparative constitutionalism).  
Anderson defines comparative constitutionalism as adjudication that “invites the 
deployment of a sweeping body of legal materials from outside U.S. domestic law into the 
process of interpreting the U.S. Constitution—and, moreover, invites it into American 
society’s most difficult and contentious ‘values’ questions.” Id.  Anderson points out the 
most controversial element to comparative constitutionalism—defining the fundamental 
rights provided by the Constitution.  Id. 
61 110 U.S. 516 (1898). 
62 In Hurtado, the defendant challenged California’s indictment process as violating the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 519.  The Court looked 
at the constitutionality of a California statute providing that a defendant could be indicted 
by information and did not require indictment from a grand jury.  Id. at 517.  The provision 
stated that “[o]ffences heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be 
prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by 
law.”  Id.  Information was filed against the defendant without prior review by a grand 
jury; he was tried, and then sentenced to death for first-degree murder.  Id. at 518. 
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bodies of justice.63  The law of England is acceptable for interpreting the 
Constitution, the Court held, as is the law from all “lands where other 
systems of jurisprudence prevail.”64  Although rare in the late 1800s, this 
attitude has gained prevalence in recent years, but not without 
considerable criticism.65  The central critique is that the Constitution is 
unique to the United States, and that a change in its interpretation by the 
Supreme Court often alters the effect of state law relying on earlier 
interpretations, thus abrogating state rights and potentially weakening 
the democratic process.66  A look at past Supreme Court decisions 
throughout history will help to understand this development, and 
provide a basis for understanding the various arguments for and against 
constitutional comparativism.67   
C. A Historical Look at the Supreme Court’s Judicial Internationalism  
The judicial use of comparative law in the United States has 
undergone multiple changes throughout history.68  From the nation’s 
beginning to the Supreme Court’s most recent decision in Roper, United 
                                                 
63 Id. at 523.  This was in response to the defendant’s use of the Magna Carta to make his 
argument.  Id. at 521.  The defendant asserted: 
[T]he phrase “due process of law” is equivalent to “law of the land,” as 
found in the 29th chapter of Magna Charta; that by immemorial usage 
it has acquired a fixed, definite, and technical meaning . . . and 
[was] . . . introduced into the Constitution of the United States as a 
limitation upon the powers of the government . . .” 
Id.  The Court responded: 
There is nothing in Magna Charta . . .which ought to exclude the best 
ideas of all systems and of every age; and as it was the characteristic 
principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every 
fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply 
have been exhausted. 
Id. at 531. 
64 Id. 
65 See infra Part II.C for a complete summary of the criticisms of constitutional 
comparativism. 
66 See infra Part III.B.3 for an analysis of where this “potential” exists more specifically. 
67 See infra Part II.D for a complete summary of these arguments. 
68 See Glensy, supra note 32, at 361-63 (discussing the patterns and methods of 
comparative law usage in the American courts); see also David Fontana, Refined 
Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 575-83 (2001)  (comparing the 
period following the founding of America to the more hesitant courts of the twentieth- and 
twenty-first centuries); Glensy, supra note 32, at 361-62 (quoting Hearing on H.R. Res. 568 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 77 (2004)) [hereinafter The Feeney Resolution]).  Glensy points out that the “use of 
international sources in cases involving purely domestic concerns is alien to the American 
legal system, historically[,]” which dispels the very premise of the Feeney Resolution.  
Glensy, supra note 32, at 361-62.  The Feeney Resolution was the first attempt by some 
members of Congress to make judicial comparativism illegal.  Id. 
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States courts have referenced foreign legal sources in a variety of cases.69  
Although the practice is relatively infrequent, it appears in nearly every 
period of America’s history.70  In surveying Supreme Court opinions 
throughout history, various trends become apparent.71  In consideration 
of this history, it also becomes obvious that only in the most recent 
decisions does the Court risk traveling down the slippery slope that 
threatens democracy by elevating foreign sources above persuasive 
authority status.72  Three time periods provide an adequate framework 
for understanding the major attitude shifts toward judicial use of 
comparative law:  (1) the period surrounding America’s change from 
colonialism to statehood up until the late 1800s;73 (2) the period between 
the conclusion of World War II and throughout most of the Cold War;74 
and (3) the period from the end of the Cold War to the present.75   
                                                 
69 Glensy, supra note 32, at 361 (“United States courts have, from the founding of the 
nation to the present day, referenced foreign legal sources in a variety of different 
contexts.”). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 362. 
72 See infra Part II.C.3. 
73 See Bodansky, supra note 60, at 421 (discussing the attitude of our founding fathers 
toward comparative law); Glensy, supra note 32, at 364 (discussing the early use of 
comparative law by the Founders and early Supreme Court Justices).  Most references to 
this period indicate that the courts referred to foreign legal concepts in a positive way.  See 
Fontana, supra note 68, at 575-83 (discussing how many early judges had an interest in 
natural law, and that this interest caused them to often look outside the Constitution in 
deciding cases); Larsen, supra note 53, at 1309-15 (discussing the Founder’s belief in a 
natural law common to all nations); Neuman, supra note 58, at 82-83  (“ . . . after the Civil 
War had vindicated the Union’s claim to nationhood, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
invoked international law doctrines and writers”). 
74 This period is the least definite of the three for picking out the attitude of judges 
toward comparative law, but nevertheless, the impact that this era had on comparative law 
in the United States in general is important because it provides an explanation for the 
opposition to judicial internationalism in the present day.  See generally Glensy, supra note 
32. 
75 Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 222 (1999) (“The American courts . . . have begun to consider the value 
of comparative materials in decision-making[,]” and that “[o]ne source of newfound 
interest in comparative law from outside the traditional sub-discipline is usually 
understood to be the new, or at least newly realized, condition of so-called globalization.”); 
see also Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 305, 310-12 
(noting that “the remarkable globalization of human freedom . . . marks the most profound 
social revolution of our time”); Slaughter, supra note 34, at 205 (noting that judicial comity 
is “a presumption of recognition that is something more than courtesy but less than 
obligation”). 
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1. The Founders and Early Decisions of the Court  
The expansive period following America’s colonialism until the late 
1800s shows the greatest level of tolerance toward judicial 
internationalism in the American legal community.76  In the early years 
of the American republic, before the United States had developed much 
law of its own, “America was fundamentally a law-taker and a law-
borrower.”77  Thus, little doubt exists whether the Founders supported 
the use of comparative law when framing the Constitution.78  For 
example, James Madison rhetorically asked how much gain America 
would have if its questions had “been previously tried by the light in 
which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind.”79  
This passage shows that the framers were very aware that judicial 
decisions in all countries had an international significance and that 
foreign decisions might be helpful for issues “tried” in America.80  At a 
minimum, these writings show an adherence to the universal truths of 
natural law principles in Constitutional interpretation.81  This Part 
illustrates how the Court’s adherence to natural law resulted in frequent 
                                                 
76 Glensy, supra note 32, at 364.  Interestingly, this period also has the fewest references 
outside of English common law.  Id.  Glensy discusses how United States courts in 
America’s formative years did not use many international legal sources because the 
practical communication difficulties at the time limited its access to those sources.  Id.  He 
states:  “Other than English common law, from which American common law was a direct 
descendent, there simply was not much foreign law available to the judges of those early 
years from which to derive comparative reasoning.”  Id. 
77 Koh, supra note 75, at 308-09.  Koh suggests that early American lawyers and judges of 
this time were educated on international legal rules and their relation to domestic legal 
rules from the beginning.  Id. 
78 Id. at 309. 
79 Bodansky, supra note 60, at 421 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison) 
(noting how attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government)).  
This concept is further supported in The Paquete Habana.  Additionally, Federalist No. 63 
asks: 
What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign 
nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, 
if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been 
previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to 
the unbiased part of mankind? 
Id. 
80 Bodansky, supra note 60, at 421. 
81 Fontana, supra note 68, at 577.  Fontana asserts that for American judges in the late 
eighteenth century, the sources of fundamental law were as open-ended as they were in 
English opposition theory.  “The colonists inherited a tradition that provided not only a 
justification for judicial review but also guidelines for its exercise . . . . [and] judges were to 
look to natural law and the inherent rights of man, as well as to the written constitution, in 
determining the validity of a statute.”  Id. 
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comparative inquiries in issues concerning international law, while 
leaving considerable ambiguity as to domestic constitutional issues.82 
Since America had next to no indigenous law of its own, the sources 
of fundamental law were considerably open-ended in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries.83  Thus, the colonists inherited their 
traditions and guidelines for judicial review.84  When the Constitution 
did not deal with a problem directly, the judges looked to natural law.85  
Thus, at least in some instances, references to foreign laws were 
customary in constitutional interpretation, but the Court lacked 
definition as to exactly when these references were appropriate.86  The 
main factor for consideration, however, was that these references could 
be a legitimizing factor within the international community.87   
Chief Justice John Jay acknowledged this legitimizing trait in 
Chisholm v. Georgia,88 when he wrote, “the United States . . . , by taking a 
                                                 
82 See infra Part II.C.1. 
83 Fontana, supra note 68, at 577.  Fontana asserts that the number of citations to 
international law was very low during that period, but the main explanations were that 
there were very few functioning constitutional courts and the amount of available 
comparative materials was next to none.  Id. at 581 n.199.  These reasons, he explains, make 
it very surprising that the courts cited to foreign sources at all.  Id.  In fact, given the ratio of 
comparative constitutional law citations to the available materials, especially considering 
the communication difficulties in obtaining those materials, the courts made a great deal of 
use out of comparative materials in the early Republic, in relative terms.  Id.; Koh, supra 
note 75, at 308. 
84 Fontana, supra note 68, at 577. 
85 Id.  Fontana notes that: 
Comparativist inquiry under natural law helped reveal these 
universalist truths by looking to the thoughts of others.  These 
“inherent rights of man” could be revealed through comparativist 
inquiry either at the time of constitutional drafting or of constitutional 
interpretation by looking to the revealed truths of natural law and 
reason as others had discovered them. 
Id.  In contrast, when the Constitution dealt with a problem in an affirmative fashion, such 
as in governmental structure cases and those providing a clear protection for individual 
rights, it was controlling.  Id. 
86 Id.  It is important to note that Fontana somewhat promptly equates the readiness of 
the founders to use foreign laws in constitutional interpretation, with the acceptability of 
American judges to use those laws in constitutional interpretation.  Id. at 578.  This Note 
does not attempt to make this equation, but rather aims at setting a general foundation for 
the attitude towards comparative law during that time period. 
87 Glensy, supra note 32, at 365. 
88 2 U.S. 419, 474 (1793).  Chisholm dealt with a suit brought against the American 
Attorney General, who claimed immunity under the state’s sovereign status.  Id. at 429.  
The Court concluded that such immunity did not exist under Article III of the Constitution, 
which provides for jurisdiction by the Court when a state was a party to a controversy 
between a state and citizens of another state.  Id. at 479. 
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place among the nations of the earth, [became] amenable to the laws of 
nations.”89  The laws of other nations served as an advisory pool for the 
Supreme Court.90  Another example of this attitude is demonstrated in 
Talbot v. Seeman,91 where Chief Justice John Marshall opined that judges 
should not construe laws of the United States as to infract common 
principles of other nations.92  These decisions never declared a standard 
governing when an inquiry into foreign legal sources was appropriate, 
but rather followed a subjective standard, illustrated in Thirty Hogsheads 
of Sugar v. Boyle.93  There the Court wrote that United States courts 
should receive the decisions of the courts of every country, as long as 
they are founded in law common to the United States, not as authority, 
but with respect.94   
Next, in Hilton v. Guyot,95 the Court stated that when it lacked 
domestic legal guidance in an international dispute, it should show 
comity to the laws of other nations.96  The Court stated that in order to 
                                                 
89 Id. at 474.    
90 Glensy, supra note 32, at 365. 
91 5 U.S. 1 (1801).  Talbot involved the presidential seizure of a French war vessel.  Id.  
The captain was ordered to seize the ship, claimed he was entitled to the salvage value of 
the ship after the court ordered him to deliver the proceeds, and he sued.  Id. at 6.  In the 
suit, the Court engaged in interpreting various acts that the Government made with 
regards to its relationship with France.  Id. at 27-30. 
92 Glensy, supra note 32, at 365 (quoting Talbot, 5 U.S. at 43). 
93 13 U.S. 191 (1815).  In Thirty Hogshead of Sugar v. Boyle, the Supreme Court reviewed a 
lower court’s decision to condemn the claimant’s sugar as enemy property.  Id.  The Danish 
claimant’s sugar was captured by the United States while raiding a British vessel that had 
docked on an island, which was a newly acquired territory of the British.  Id.  The Court 
concluded that once the island, which was originally Danish-owned, was acquired by the 
British, the soil and the product that came from the soil became British property as a result.  
Id.  Although the claimant, a Danish man, was at war with Britain, his incorporation in a 
British territory qualified his land as enemy territory.  Id. at 197. 
94 Id. at 198 (emphasis added).  Thus, although these foreign decisions were never 
binding, the Court did receive them and advisory aid in order to show respect to other 
nations.  Glensy, supra note 32, at 366. 
95 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (considering the extent to which the United States should 
recognize foreign decisions in a contract case involving French plaintiffs and American 
defendants). 
96 Id. at 162-64. Comity means that courts owe respect “to the laws and acts of other 
nations by virtue of common membership in the international system.”  Slaughter, supra 
note 34, at 205.  Another good example of the Court’s subscription to comity is The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon, where Chief Justice Marshall expressed his concern that America 
would violate its good faith abroad if it acted in a manner inconsistent with the rest of the 
world. 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812).  This effort to find consistency with the rest of the world 
came down to an issue of comity for the laws of other nations.  Perhaps an even clearer 
example is Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, which involved an inquiry into whether the appellate 
power of the Supreme Court extended to the state court of appeals.  14 U.S. 304 (1816).  The 
Court stated that “[i]t would . . . be perilous to restrain [the Court] in any manner 
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preserve American sovereignty, while comity carried no obligation, it 
should still provide more than simple courtesy and good will.97  The 
Court thus balanced the priority of recognizing foreign laws with the 
obligation to preserve America’s sovereignty.98  This goal was very clear 
in the line of cases that began with Chisholm in 1793 and capsulated with 
Hilton in 1894, but all of those cases concerned an international dispute 
of some sort.99  As a result, although the Court’s goal of comity to other 
nations was clear, it was equally clear that the direct international 
consequences carried by these cases demanded a greater level of 
respect.100  The Court left open the issue of how comity could justify 
following foreign precedents for domestic constitutional questions, and 
only in a few later cases did the Court address this question.101   
In Worcester v. Georgia,102 Chief Justice Marshall looked to the laws of 
other nations to help define the status of Indian tribes under the 
Constitution.103  Later, in Holmes v. Jennison,104 Chief Justice Roger Taney 
looked to the foreign interpretation of various words in the Constitution 
                                                                                                             
whatsoever, inasmuch as it might hazard the national safety.”  Id. at 335.  When dealing 
with a question of which “the principles of the law and comity of nations often form an 
essential inquiry,” i.e., those that involve matters in which other nations are “deeply 
interested,” comity towards those nation’s laws is essential.  Id.  For further reference into 
the contextual background of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, see Sanchez, supra note 24, at 14. 
97 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 113. 
98 For a full analysis of the Hilton decision, see Sanchez, supra note 24, at 16-18. 
99 See supra notes 91, 93, 95 and accompanying text.  Talbot and Thirty Hogsheads involved 
an international maritime dispute, whereas Hilton dealt with an international tort conflict. 
100 See supra notes 91, 93, 95 and accompanying text. 
101 See infra notes 102, 105. 
102 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
103 Id. at 560-61.  In this case, the State of Georgia prosecuted missionaries for residing on 
the Cherokee reservation which violated a state law prohibiting whites from residing in 
Cherokee territory without a license.  Id. at 529, 532.  The missionaries appealed to the 
Supreme Court, arguing that the federal rights of the Cherokee Nation invalidated the 
Georgia statute.  Id. at 525.  Citing Vattel, Justice Marshall held America to the principles of 
foreign law, finding that the weak states do not surrender their right to self-government 
and independence when under protection of a stronger state.  For more discussion of this 
case, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and 
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 40 
(2002). 
104 39 U.S. 540 (1840). The issue in Holmes was whether a state had power under the 
Constitution to deliver an individual found within its territory to a foreign government to 
be tried for offences alleged to have been committed against that government.  Id. at 561.  
The court answered the question in the negative, noting that U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10 
prohibited states from entering into agreements with foreign governments.  Id. at 570.  The 
constitutional prohibition applied, not only to a continuing agreement embracing classes of 
cases, or a succession of cases, but to any agreement whatever.  Id. at 572.  Thus, the 
governor lacked authority to issue the warrant, and petitioner was entitled to his release.  
Id. at 579. 
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in order to understand why the framers used those words.105  In both 
Holmes and Worcester, the Court used foreign sources of law to determine 
issues that were, in effect, purely domestic.106  These decisions faced little 
opposition to their foreign references, most likely because of their mere 
expository nature, but a clear dispute would later develop against 
similar cases with a purely domestic application, particularly with 
regard to human rights issues.107  
Specifically, two main cases reveal an opposition to the use of 
international legal sources during that time period.108  In Chisholm, 
Justice Blair argued that the European Confederation was not sufficiently 
close to justify an analogical application to American law.109  Similarly, 
the majority opinion of Dred Scott v. Sandford110 rejected comparative 
arguments that discredited its decision.111  The Court declared that 
changes in public opinion in Europe, or even in America, should never 
induce the Court to give the Constitution a more liberal construction.112  
These opinions show that although the Court was willing to accept 
foreign legal references in areas concerning international law, it sought 
                                                 
105 Id. at 569-73 (using foreign law when deciding whether the Constitution would allow 
a state governor to extradite a guilty defendant to Canada). The Court wrote: 
A few extracts from an eminent writer on the laws of nations, showing 
the manner in which these different words have been used, and the 
different meanings sometimes attached to them, will, perhaps, 
contribute to explain the reason for using them all in the Constitution; 
and will prove that the most comprehensive terms were employed in 
prohibiting to the States all intercourse with foreign nations. 
Id. at 572. 
106 For additional references of judges citing to purely domestic sources, see Fontana, 
supra note 68, at 582-83, who looks to quotations of Roman law, civil law, and English 
common law extensively. 
107 Infra notes 109-13. 
108 Infra notes 109-13. 
109 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 450 (1793).  Justice Blair stated that European 
precedents are “utterly destitute of any binding authority . . .”  Id.  Likewise, in his dissent, 
Justice Iredell contended in the same decision that no part of foreign law could apply to the 
case, and that the decision should rely on constitutional authority alone.  Id. at 449. 
110 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that descendants of Africans who were sold as slaves could 
never become citizens of the United States). 
111 Id. at 426. 
112 Id.  The Court declared that: 
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or 
feeling . . . in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should 
induce the [Supreme Court] to give to the words of the constitution a 
more liberal construction . . . than they were intended to bear when the 
instrument was framed and adopted. 
Id. 
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independence in areas of law that did not directly concern other 
nations—a divergence that carried well into the twentieth century.113 
2. Post World War II Decisions  
The attitudes toward comparative law in the American legal 
community following World War II provide a partial explanation of the 
present attitudes toward judicial internationalism.114  Natural law 
principles that transcend all borders, those relied on by the Court 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, faded from legal 
scholarship during that period.115  Likewise, the Cold War and America’s 
global hegemony largely paralyzed positive comparative thought in 
America’s legal community.116  As a result, the United States adopted a 
much more exclusive view of national membership and human rights.117  
As shown below, this attitude had little effect on the judges on the bench 
at the time, but created hesitancy in the judges who were being educated 
during that period.118  Part II.C.2 describes the internationally unfettered 
decisions made by the Court at the very end of World War II until the 
early 1960s.119   
                                                 
113 See infra Part II.C.2. 
114 Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra note 58; see also Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among 
Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 
1909 (1992) (showing the similarities between nations during the Cold War); Michael W. 
Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 206 (1983) 
(referring to the peace achieved between states since World War II); Koh, supra note 75, at 
308-09 (explaining that the days of American global hegemony brought an obsession with 
America and the “domestic legal agenda largely drove out the international”).  Koh also 
mentions that the dark days of the Cold War paralyzed comparative law in America.  Koh, 
supra note 75, at 309; see also Fontana, supra note 68, at 544-45 (2001) (addressing the Cold 
War changes). 
115 Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra note 58, at 662 (“The decline of natural law 
interpretations of the Constitution in the nineteenth century is well documented.”).  For 
further references, Alford cites to Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 43, 65-68 (1989); and William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery 
Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
513 (1974).  Contributing to this decline was the growing idea that reality is not fixed, but 
disjointed and open to many interpretations.  Riles, supra note 75, at 254. 
116 Koh, supra note 75, at 309. 
117 Cleveland, supra note 103, at 283-84. 
118 Koh, supra note 75, at 309.  Koh contends that the lack of emphasis on international 
laws in legal scholarship resulted in a generation of judges with little education as to the 
influence of international law on United States law.  See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational 
Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2364 (1991) (demonstrating that a generation of 
lawyers and judges reached maturity unaware of America’s rich judicial history of using 
international law). 
119 See infra Part II.C.2. 
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Justice Frankfurter’s decisions provide the most comprehensive use 
of comparative reasoning during that period.120  He quoted foreign law 
frequently using both positive references, following the precedents of 
other countries, and negative references, distinguishing foreign 
precedents from American law.121  Most significant were Justice 
Frankfurter’s decisions pertaining to individual liberties under the 
Constitution.122  For example, in Smith v. California,123 Justice Frankfurter 
found that it was acceptable to allow expert testimony to show evolving 
standards of decency, borrowing his reasoning from recent debates from 
the House of Commons.124  In Culombe v. Connecticut,125 Justice 
Frankfurter substantially discussed foreign materials to exemplify the 
world’s unanimity on the belief that personal liberty mandates a 
guarantee that little time pass between arrest and appearance in court.126  
                                                 
120 Fontana, supra note 68, at 583 (noting that Justice Frankfurter is “perhaps the most 
active comparativist in the history of the Court”). 
121 Id. at 583-84. (“Frankfurter would treat the answers of other constitutional 
systems . . . as relevant, sometimes . . . treating those comparative sources as precedents. At 
other times, [he] would use negative comparativism, claiming that American commitments 
were defined by our constitutional differences from other federal structures.”).  Cases using 
both positive and negative sources are found in Fontana, supra note 68, at 584 nn.211-12.  
Compare, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583-84 n.5 (1946) (noting that 
“[a]ttempts . . . to solve kindred problems arising under the Canadian and Australian 
Constitutions have also proved to be a barren process” when deciding whether Congress 
had the right to tax the State of New York on sale of mineral water); O’Malley v. 
Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 281 nn.6 & 8, 282 (1939) (using foreign precedent to determine 
whether the imposition of an income tax on judges’ salaries was constitutional); Graves v. 
New York, 306 U.S. 466, 90-91 n.1 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (using other federal 
systems to argue for the abandonment of tax immunity doctrine), with Irvin v. Dowd, 359 
U.S. 394, 408 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (comparing other countries’ systems of 
federal judicial review with America’s); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 
354, 361 (1959) (distinguishing federal maritime jurisdiction from other federal systems, 
noting “[s]uch a system is not an inherent requirement of a federal government”); Williams 
v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 304 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (rejecting other 
countries’ federal systems that do not uphold the states’ rights to regulate marriage and 
divorce). 
122 Fontana, supra note 68, at 583-84. 
123 361 U.S. 147, 166-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
124 Frankfurter noted that these debates “impressively” explained “[t]he importance of 
this type of evidence.”  Smith, 361 U.S. at 166 (citing 597 Parliamentary Debates, H. Comm., 
No. 36 (Dec. 16, 1958)).  Some scholars have referred to this approach to comparative 
reasoning among judges as “reason-borrowing.”  See Larsen, supra note 53, at 1291-92. 
125 367 U.S. 568, 583-84, n.25 (1961). 
126 Id.  For further decisions by Frankfurt, see Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206 
(1953) (dissenting); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251 n.1 (1946) (majority opinion); New 
York v. United States, 326 U.S. at 573, 580 n.4 (majority opinion); United States v. County of 
Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 198 (1944) (dissent); Williams, 317 U.S. at 304-05 (concurrence) 
(upholding the states’ ability to regulate marriage and divorce, despite foreign federal 
systems to the contrary); State Tax Comm’n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 184 (1942) (concurrence); 
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Following his lead, subsequent judges referenced international legal 
sources in multiple other cases involving individual liberties such as the 
cruel and unusual punishment standard addressed in Trop v. Dulles,127 
the Fifth Amendment protection for criminals in Miranda v. Arizona,128 
and the right to abortion in Roe v. Wade.129  
In Trop, in order to interpret the scope of the Eighth Amendment, the 
Court “[drew] . . . meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society”; a test used in later Eighth 
Amendment decisions.130  With the help of an international consensus, 
the Court found that depriving an individual of his citizenship is a cruel 
and unusual punishment.131  Similarly, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court 
cited four commonwealth nations to help justify requiring police to read 
a criminal his rights before arrest.132  Finally, unlike in Trop, the Court in 
Roe v. Wade did not discriminate between civilized democracies, as it did 
in Trop, when it looked to Roman, Persian, Greek, and English laws alike 
to show that abortion is a historically accepted practice.133  These 
decisions show a clear policy of looking to the “standards of decency” 
not only in America, but also throughout the world, to define individual 
liberties under the Constitution.134  On the surface, the Court gave more 
deference to foreign precedents than it did to all state laws to the 
                                                                                                             
Graves, 306 U.S. at 487 n.1 (concurrence) (involving a decision on intergovernmental tax 
immunity). 
127 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (ruling that depriving an individual of his citizenship violated the 
Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual punishment). 
128 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring procedural safeguards to protect the privilege of self-
incrimination). 
129 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortion). 
130 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
131 Id. at 102-03.  Noting that out of eighty-four countries surveyed, all but two were in 
unanimity that statelessness is unacceptable as punishment for crime.  Id.  The Court stated: 
“[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be 
imposed as punishment for crime” and that a “United Nations’ survey of the nationality 
laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that only two countries . . . impose denationalization 
as a penalty for desertion.”  Id. 
132 Miranda, 356 U.S. at 486-90.  The Court found from these sources that “lawlessness 
will not result from warning an individual of his rights or allowing him to exercise them.”  
Id. at 489.  For nearly five pages of the decision, the majority examined the protection given 
to citizens in England, Scotland, and India, pertaining to custodial interrogation.  Id. at 486-
90.  The Court noted that where foreign jurisdictions have such protection absent 
Constitutional provisions, the United States should “give at least as much protection to 
these rights as is given in [these] jurisdictions” because of the extra protection under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.  Id. at 489-90. 
133 Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-33. 
134 Glensy, supra note 32, at 372.  But see also Anderson, supra note 28, at 34-37 (criticizing 
the notion of universal rights, and attributing the Court’s references to “universal” as 
merely meaning “international”). 
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contrary.135  Thus, this period marks the beginning of a slippery slope, 
where the Court began to use foreign laws to overturn state laws 
concerning issues that had no real foreign significance, while ignoring 
foreign laws to the contrary.136  Since then, the Court has looked to the 
international arena in almost every decision involving individual 
liberties cases.137   
3. Comparative Constitutionalism from the 1980s to the Present  
Although many scholars currently downplay the significance of 
comparative references, their impact should not be underestimated.138  
For one, the notion of “universal rights” that transcend borders has 
resulted in more comparative references in constitutional questions than 
ever before.139  Additionally, the references carry great significance 
through wide implications pertaining to how America should view 
future jurisprudence.140  Yet another change in the significance of these 
decisions during this period is in the universality of references to foreign 
laws, including cases implicating the Eighth Amendment,141 Substantive 
                                                 
135 See supra notes 130-34. 
136 See Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra note 60, at 670 (“It should be noted that the 
reasoning and holding in [Roe] have been rejected elsewhere.”).  But the Court has not 
viewed and likely will not view international sources as “emphatically relevant” in 
determining the scope of reproductive freedoms in this country. 
137 See infra Part II.C.3. 
138 Glensy, supra note 32, at 373.  Glensy looks to Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning 
and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 419-20 (2003), which concludes that out of the 
rare instances of comparative references, they were nothing more than “references.”  See 
also Louis J. Blum, Mixed Signals: The Limited Role of Comparative Analysis in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 157, 171 (2002) (noting that comparative references in 
recent years are “not central to any conclusion reached, and that the resulting 
interpretation of the Constitution could stand independently of foreign support”). 
139 See Harding, supra note 138, at 410-11.  Harding comments, “Comparativists have 
traditionally focused on private rather than public law, and one would expect judges to 
reflect this practice by thinking about foreign law in private law issues before incorporating 
it in constitutional cases.”  Id. 
140 Glensy, supra note 32, at 373.  Glensy noted that “given the increasing use of 
comparative analysis, one should not minimize the doctrinal impact of foreign materials on 
Eighth Amendment and Due Process jurisprudence, or the fact that the Supreme Court sees 
fit to engage in this type of analysis in these contexts.”  Id. 
141 Since Trop v. Dulles, discussed supra part II.C.2, the Court has used comparative 
analysis in many cases besides Roper.  See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(determining whether execution of mentally retarded is cruel and unusual by reference to a 
national consensus against the practice); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) 
(upholding death penalty for those 16 and older); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988) (banning the death penalty for murderers 15 and younger); Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782, 796 (1982) (banning the death penalty for those convicted of felony murder); 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (banning the death penalty for rape offenders). 
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Due Process,142 Federalism,143 and Equal Protection.144  These cases show 
a clear “diversification” of the contexts where the Court finds it proper to 
expand its jurisprudence with comparative analysis in purely domestic 
issues.145 
The phenomenon of globalization offers significant explanation for 
this diversification because of the incomparable level of access it 
provides to foreign domestic laws.146  However, globalization can carry 
significant problems.147  This “problem of globalization” is best 
summarized by Professor Koh, who stated “[a] major challenge currently 
facing global policymakers is deciding, as we marketize globally and 
democratize locally, how best to promote human rights without sacrificing 
cultural values[,]” most importantly, democracy.148  Multiple members of 
                                                 
142 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (upholding rights for homosexuals); 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (assisted suicide); Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 (1992) (abortion); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986) (rejecting rights for homosexuals). 
143 Some cases using comparative analysis for issues of federalism include Nixon v. Shrink 
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (looking to foreign court decisions on First Amendment 
issues); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking portions of the Brady Bill, 
dealing with gun control); and Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 814 (1997) (striking down the Line 
Item Veto statute). 
144 The most significant comparative equal protection ruling is Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003), which looked to international legal precedent in upholding the University 
of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program. 
145 Glensy, supra note 32, at 373-87. 
146 See generally Koh, supra note 75.  The increase in use of comparative references during 
the World Wars and especially in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first centuries makes 
sense as communication and the number of democratic nations exponentially increased 
worldwide.  Id. at 310.  Professor Koh, in his article The Globalization of Freedom, shows that 
only three decades ago, there were fewer than twenty-five democracies in the world.  Id.  
Presently, approximately 120 nations out of more that 190 total governments qualify (either 
in form or in substance) as governments with stated commitments to the preservation of 
freedom and democratic self-governance.  Id.  This results in approximately 64% of the 
world’s population now living under some form of democratic rule.  Id. 
147 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (looking to international legal precedent in 
upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program); infra note 
148; see also Glensy, supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
148 Koh, supra note 75, at 311 (emphasis added).  In his article, Koh discusses how 
scholars have largely overlooked the globalization of human freedom that, to his mind, 
marks the most profound social revolution of our time.  Id. at 310.  Koh opines that, in the 
world of foreign policy in the government, the politicians that have innovative ideas have 
too little influence, while those with influence have too few ideas.  Id.  “In the policy world, 
what academics write about is usually scorned, and more often, utterly ignored.”  Id.  Koh 
uses this analysis to lead into his statement quoted above, that it is the threat of sacrificing 
cultural values that causes people to object to new ideas, both at home and abroad.  Id. at 
311.  Then, perhaps most importantly, he ties this into the context of American education, 
stating that, “We must teach others how to perpetuate their new and frightening freedom 
through the construction of wise restraints, the teaching of cultural understanding and 
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the Supreme Court have also recognized this problem.149  Although six 
Justices from the Rehnquist Court, including Justice O’Connor, accepted 
comparative jurisprudence, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist rejected comparative jurisprudence.150  The two areas where 
these Justices have criticized judicial internationalism the most are cases 
involving the constitutionality of anti-sodomy statutes and the death 
penalty.151  It is in these decisions that the Court traveled furthest down 
the slippery slope, putting states’ rights at risk.152 
a. Anti-Sodomy Decisions  
In Bowers v. Hardwick,153 a conservative Supreme Court upheld a 
state’s anti-sodomy statute, and analyzed proscriptions against 
homosexual conduct throughout world history.154  The Court rejected the 
contention that homosexuality is implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty and passed it off as “facetious.”155  Sixteen years later, a more 
liberal Court used the same comparative reasoning from Bowers to 
overturn the decision.156  In Lawrence v. Texas,157 the Court overturned 
Bowers, rendering unconstitutional all laws prohibiting homosexual 
conduct.158  From the onset of the decision, the Lawrence Court suggested 
                                                                                                             
tolerance, the development of self-sustaining social, political and economic institutions, 
and the acceptance of human dignity and human rights as genuinely universal values.”  Id.  
It is the acceptance of the “genuinely universal” nature of human rights and dignity that 
lawmakers and judges need to promote.  See generally Part III. 
149 Infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. 
150 Anderson, supra note  28, at 4.  See generally Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).  
It is important to note that the new Roberts Court has yet to speak on this subject; however, 
Chief Justice Roberts voiced an opinion similar to Justice Alito’s in his confirmation 
hearings, that constitutional comparativism “allows the judge to incorporate his or her own 
personal preferences, cloak them with the authority of precedent—because they’re finding 
precedent in foreign law—and use that to determine the meaning of the Constitution.”  
Larisa Epatko, John Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States, PBS ONLINE NEWS HOUR (2005), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/law/supreme_court/justices/index.h
tml (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
151 See infra Parts II.C.3.a-II.C.3.b. 
152 See infra Part III. 
153 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
154 Id. at 192. 
155 Id. at 194. In his concurrence, Justice Burger utilized comparative analysis even more 
by looking to Roman, English, and early American law, reasoning that “[t]o hold that the 
act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast 
aside millennia of moral teaching.”  Id. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring). 
156 Infra note 157. 
157 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
158 Id. at 558.  Specifically, the decision declared unconstitutional a Texas statute 
prohibiting two adult persons of the same sex from voluntarily engaging in intimate sexual 
conduct.  Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/9
2007] Constitutional Comparativism 1761 
that Bowers had always been wrong to hold that prohibitions on 
homosexual sodomy reflected values shared with a “wider 
civilization.”159  As evidence, the Court pointed out that the European 
Court of Human Rights has always held that anti-sodomy laws violate 
the European Convention on Human Rights.160  In addition, the Court 
relied heavily on the English precedent in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.161  
The Court offered no reasoning or justification for its references; thus, 
the mere fact that other nations accepted the individual’s right to engage 
in homosexual sodomy seemed important enough for the Court’s 
constitutional analysis.162  The Court utilized comparative analyses just 
as freely in its most recent death penalty decisions.163  
b. Death Penalty Cases 
The three most significant death penalty cases invoking the Courts’ 
comparative reasoning are Thompson v. Oklahoma,164 Atkins v. Virginia,165 
and Roper v. Simmons.166  Decided in 1988, the Thompson decision looked 
to whether “cruel and unusual punishments” under the Constitution 
forbade the execution of juveniles ages fifteen and younger.167  All nine 
Justices agreed that the governing standard for separating cruel and 
unusual punishments was “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”168  Where they disagreed was in 
choosing which societies counted.169  After a brief discussion of a 
                                                 
159 Id. at 576.  On respect for “the Opinions of [Human]kind,” the Lawrence Court 
emphasized that “The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral 
part of human freedom in many other countries.”  Id. at 577. 
160 Id. at 573-77.  The Court mentioned that many other nations act consistently with the 
protected rights of homosexual adults to engage in consensual conduct, and that there is no 
proof that America’s governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is more 
legitimate than the interests of other nations.  Id. at 577.  The Court announced, “The right 
the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in 
many other countries. There has been no showing that in this country the governmental 
interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.”  Id. 
161 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (scr.A) (1981).  Specifically, this case held that a Northern Ireland law 
criminalizing consensual adult sodomy violated the right to respect private lives under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.  Id.  This was the first time in history that the Supreme Court relied on an 
international tribunal decision to interpret individual liberties embodied in the 
Constitution.  Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra note 58, at 640. 
162 See Larsen, supra note 53, at 1297. 
163 See infra Part II.C.b. 
164 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
165 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
166 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
167 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
168 Id. at 821 (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
169 Id. at 865. 
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national consensus, Justice Stevens turned to the views expressed by the 
leading members of the Western European community.170  However, 
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that where there is not first a settled 
consensus among Americans, the views of other nations cannot be 
imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.171  This statement is 
significant because even though Justice Scalia is opposed to 
constitutional comparativism, he evinces that it might be more 
acceptable if a national consensus existed.172   
The Court enlisted similar arguments in Atkins v. Virginia.173  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Stevens indicated a significant national 
consensus against the practice of executing the mentally retarded.174  He 
then supported the national consensus by acknowledging that the 
                                                 
170 Id. at 830-31, 865.  Justice Stevens listed those countries that impose the death penalty 
but exclude minors, listing the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union, 
which all retain the death penalty generally, but forbid the execution of minors.  Id.  He 
also listed those countries that abolished the death penalty altogether, noting that West 
Germany, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries 
completely abolished the penalty, and that it is available only for exceptional crimes such 
as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland.  Id. at 831.  In addition, Stevens 
reported that “three major human rights treaties explicitly prohibit juvenile death 
penalties.”  Id. at 831 n.34. 
171 Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia concluded: 
In the present case, therefore, the fact that a majority of foreign nations 
would not impose capital punishment upon persons under 16 at the 
time of the crime is of no more relevance than the fact that a majority 
of them would not impose capital punishment at all, or have standards 
of due process quite different from our own. 
Id. at 868-69 n.4 (internal citations omitted).  A year later, Scalia mirrored this argument in 
another death penalty case by pointing out that, although the views of other countries may 
sometimes be relevant, it is the “American conceptions of decency that are dispositive.”  
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-70 n.1 (1989).  He clarifies this statement by 
explaining that: 
While “[t]he practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, 
can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our 
people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty’ that it occupies a place not merely in our 
mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well,” they cannot 
serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the 
practice is accepted among our people. 
Id. 
172 Namely, Scalia notes that “where there is not first a settled consensus among” 
Americans, foreign law should not be used for comparison.  487 U.S. at 868 n.4. 
173 See infra note 174. 
174 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002).  The consensus consisted of a list of nineteen states (plus 
the federal government) that all passed enactments banning the death penalty for the 
mentally retarded within an eleven year period.  Id.  Two additional states had legislation 
pending at the time.  Id. at 315. 
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imposition of the death penalty for the mentally retarded was 
“overwhelmingly disapproved” within the world community, providing 
multiple examples.175  But Atkins did not settle the issue and the debate 
continued in the Court’s recent death penalty decision of Roper v. 
Simmons.176 
Justice Kennedy wrote the Roper decision, and as in Atkins, he first 
attemped to pinpoint a “national consensus” in America against the 
punishment; however, the consensus was much weaker than in Atkins.177  
                                                 
175 Id. at 317 n.21.  It is important to note that in Atkins, a group of American diplomats 
filed an amicus brief arguing that the execution would “strain diplomatic relations with 
close American allies, provide diplomatic ammunition to countries with demonstrably 
worse human rights records, increase American isolation and impair other United States 
foreign policy interests.”  Id.  This argument, that ruling a certain way would strain our 
relations with other countries, is frequently raised to offer justification for constitutional 
comparativism.  See supra Part II.D.1 for a complete summary of arguments supporting 
constitutional comparativism.  Justice Scalia again dissented, repeating verbatim his 
arguments from Thompson, but with less consideration for constitutional comparativism 
than in Thompson.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia added that 
“[t]he Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus’ must go to 
its appeal . . . to the views of . . . the so-called ‘world community.’” Id.  He continued by 
adding: “Equally irrelevant are the practices of the ‘world community,’ whose notions of 
justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.”  Id. 
176 See infra notes 177-84. 
177 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).  The Roper Majority overturned Stanford v. Kentucky and banned 
the death penalty for all offenders under the age of eighteen.  Id. at 1192-98.  Justice Scalia 
commented on this finding of a national consensus by reciting: 
the Court dutifully recites this test and claims halfheartedly that a 
national consensus has emerged since our decision in Stanford, because 
18 States—or 47% of States that permit capital punishment—now have 
legislation prohibiting the execution of offenders under 18, and 
because all of four States have adopted such legislation since Stanford.  
Words have no meaning if the views of less than 50% of death penalty 
States can constitute a national consensus.  Our previous cases have 
required overwhelming opposition to a challenged practice, generally 
over a long period of time. 
Id. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Also, although she agreed with the Court’s use of 
comparative constitutional analysis, Justice O’Connor dissented from the Court’s holding 
precisely because she did not believe that the Court found a genuine national consensus.  
Id. at 1206 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  She stated: 
Although the Court finds support for its decision in the fact that a 
majority of the States now disallow capital punishment of 17-year-old 
offenders, it refrains from asserting that its holding is compelled by a 
genuine national consensus. Indeed, the evidence before us fails to 
demonstrate conclusively that any such consensus has emerged in the 
brief period since we upheld the constitutionality of this practice in 
Stanford v. Kentucky.  Instead, the rule decreed by the Court rests, 
ultimately, on its independent moral judgment that death is a 
disproportionately severe punishment for any 17-year-old offender. 
Id. 
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Justice Kennedy then turned to confirm the majority’s opinion by noting 
that the United States was essentially alone in its sanction of the juvenile 
death penalty.178  As support, Justice Kennedy cited treaties that rejected 
the juvenile death penalty such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights179 and Article 37 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.180  But Justice Scalia again dissented with 
strong criticism of the Court’s use of comparative analysis.181  In all of 
these decisions—Bowers, Lawrence, Thompson, and Atkins—the majority 
first looked to a national consensus to make its decision; however, in 
Roper and Lawrence, the Court placed considerable weight on the foreign 
sources where a national consensus was less than “overwhelming.”182  
Thus, these recent decisions followed the decisions in the early twentieth 
century that started down a slippery slope that gives more deference to 
                                                 
178 Id. at 1198 (majority).  Justice Kennedy wrote: “Our determination that the death 
penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the 
stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give 
official sanction” to the punishment.  Id.  Although citations to foreign sources in Eighth 
Amendment cases had become the standard since the Trop opinion, this reference was 
partly in response to the multiple amicus briefs filed by European Union representatives, 
Nobel Peace Prize laureates, former United States diplomats, and human rights 
organizations, asking the Court to ban the juvenile death penalty.  See respectively Brief of 
Amici Curiae The European Union, Roper v. Simmons, 2004 WL 1619203 (July 12, 2004) 
(No. 03-633); Brief of Amici Curiae President James Earl Carter, Jr., Roper v. Simmons, 2004 
WL 1636446 (July 19, 2004) (No. 03-633); Brief of Amici Curiae former U.S. Diplomats 
Morton Abramowitz et al., Roper v. Simmons, 2004 WL 1636448 (July 19, 2004) (No. 03-
633); Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Comm. of the Bar of England and Wales, Roper 
v. Simmons, 2004 WL 1628523 (July 15, 2004) (No. 03-633).  These briefs presented 
arguments contending that foreign laws should influence the Court’s decision, and made 
showings that virtually every country in the world had abolished the practice of sentencing 
juveniles to death.  Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198. 
179 Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
180 Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).  Although the United 
States had not ratified either, Justice Kennedy noted that Congress had since banned the 
death penalty for juveniles under the Federal Death Penalty Act.  18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2000). 
181 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1225 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Scalia began his dissent stating that 
“[t]hough the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision 
today, the views of other countries and the so-called international community take center 
stage.”  Id.  It is important to note that although Justice O’Connor dissented from the 
opinion, she did so separately from Scalia because she approved of the Court’s 
comparative reasoning in theory.  Id. at 1215 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  However, 
O’Connor does state that, in the present circumstance, the Court’s comparative reasoning 
was inappropriate because it did not first find a true national consensus.  Id. at 1216.  “The 
instant case presents no such domestic consensus, however, and the recent emergence of an 
otherwise global consensus does not alter that basic fact.”  Id. 
182 Namely, these sources did not borrow the reasoning from other countries, or observe 
the practical results that followed foreign enactments, but the majority cited those sources 
simply because they were consistent with the alleged consensus in America, and they 
confirmed the Court’s value judgment.  See infra Parts II.B.3.a-II.B.3.c. 
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foreign laws than it does to state laws.183  Roper has since sparked 
renewed discussion on both sides of the debate.184 
D. Contemporary Arguments Surrounding Constitutional Comparativism 
This line of decisions, beginning with Lawrence and concluding with 
Roper, has resulted in vast debate over the validity of constitutional 
comparativism, especially in the highlighted cases that cite international 
law for the sole reason that it is in accordance with the majority’s view.185  
Just prior to the decision in Roper, Justices Scalia and Breyer held a public 
debate at American University, discussing constitutional 
comparativism’s relevancy in the various judicial philosophies.186  
Shortly after the debate, Justice Ginsburg gave a speech before The 
American Society of International Law, supporting constitutional 
comparativism based on her interpretation of history and her personal 
philosophies.187  Also in response, a bill was introduced called the 
Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, which would make constitutional 
comparativism an impeachable offense for all federal judges engaging in 
the practice.188  Part II.D summarizes the best arguments for 
constitutional comparativism, and then looks at the arguments against 
it.189  
1. Arguments Defending Constitutional Comparativism  
Arguments supporting the use of constitutional comparativism 
begin with the underlying principle that the body of American judges is 
very small compared to the global “judicial enterprise,” which has the 
                                                 
183 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
184 See infra Part II.D. 
185 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1301-02. 
186 See Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 43.  Justice Scalia admits that comparative 
references are sometimes needed in cases that require the interpretation of treaties; 
however, when interpreting the Constitution as applied to domestic American affairs, 
Scalia said the Court should stick strictly to domestic inquiry.  Id. 
187 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for the American Constitution Society, Looking 
Beyond our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional 
Adjudication (Aug. 2, 2003), http://www.americanconstitutionsociety.org/pdf/Ginsburg 
%20transcript%20final.pdf. 
188 The Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070 § 302, 109th Cong. (2005).  This 
was not the first piece of legislation to this effect.  Following the decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas, Congressmen introduced the Feeney Resolution, which declared that the federal 
courts should not rely on foreign sources in their Constitutional interpretation.  See supra 
note 68 (discussing the Feeney Resolution). 
189 See infra Parts II.D.1-II.D.2. 
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task of finding consistency in the realm of human rights.190  According to 
this view, fundamental rights are universal by definition, and global 
courts have an obligation to learn from each other when defining those 
rights under the Constitution.191  Perhaps the most general justification 
for this lies in the notion of comity.192  Expanding upon this notion, some 
scholars argue that failure to use comparativism could damage foreign 
policy by making the United States look hypocritical in the realm of 
human rights.193  Another argument is that the founders intended for the 
courts to interpret the Constitution with “community standards” by 
leaving it relatively open-ended.194  Professor Larsen provides 
justification for those instances where the Court uses international legal 
sources for their benefits as empirical and expository aids.195  Another 
                                                 
190 Slaughter, supra note 34, at 193.  Judge Posner, one of present day’s leading 
pragmatists, has criticized this argument heavily.  Posner asserts that to cite “foreign law as 
authority is to . . . suppose fantastically that the world’s judges constitute a single, elite 
community of wisdom and conscience.”  Richard A. Posner, “No Thanks, We Already Have 
Our Own Laws,” 40 LEG. AFF. (July–Aug. 2004). 
191 Glensy, supra note 32 (noting that human rights issues have universal importance that 
transcends national borders); see also Randall R. Murphy, The Framers’ Evolutionary 
Perception of Rights: Using International Human Rights Norms as a Source for Discovery of Ninth 
Amendment Rights, 21 STETSON L. REV. 457-59 (1991) (discussing the Founder’s view of 
universal rights of individuals by looking at a court decision called Henfield’s Case, 11 F. 
Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360), written by Justice John Jay before he became Chief 
Justice). 
192 Slaughter, supra note 34, at 205; see also Ginsburg’s Address, supra note 60, at 7 
(justifying comity because “projects vital to [the Court’s] well being—combating 
international terrorism is a prime example—require trust and cooperation of nations the 
world over”). 
193 See Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: 
A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 825-27 
(1990) (“If the courts chose not to embrace international human rights norms as a source of 
guidance concerning fundamental rights . . . [t]he immediate effect would be that the 
United States would lose the high moral ground when citing human rights violations by 
other nations.”); see also Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitutional and International 
Human Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 76-77 (1990); Brief of Amici Curiae former U.S. 
Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al., Roper v. Simmons, 2004 WL 1636448 (July 19, 2004) 
(No. 03-633); Brief of Amici Curiae Mary Robinson et al, Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 WL 
164151 (Jan. 16, 2003) (No. 02-102); see also Bodansky, supra note 60, at 427 (arguing that 
constitutional comparativism is pragmatic because it helps avoid friction with the rest of 
world). 
194 Bodansky, supra note 60, at 425.  Bodansky points out how many provisions invoke 
“community standards” such as the “cruel and unusual punishment” standard in the 
Eighth Amendment, the notion of “due process of law” in the Fifth Amendment, and the 
prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures” in the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
195 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1297-1301.  However, Professor Larsen rejects any reference 
based purely on moral fact-finding.  See infra notes 203-04; see also Neuman, supra note 58, 
at 87 (supporting the empirical use of international references based on the assumption that 
the doctrines of regional and global human rights systems are less likely to depend on the 
individual characteristics of foreign legal systems). 
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argument promoted by Justice Breyer takes the position that foreign case 
law is simply information like any other source—the same as treatises, 
law journals, or academic lectures—and it should not receive any 
different treatment.196  The arguments against constitutional 
comparativism mirror these arguments in part, but diverge in many 
critical ways.197 
2. Arguments Against Constitutional Comparativism  
Arguments against constitutional comparativism are much more 
serious than Justice Breyer’s light-hearted approach.198  Although not 
exclusively the case, the most recent decisions invoking constitutional 
comparativism have primarily advanced a liberal agenda, whereas much 
of the criticism has come from the conservative right.199  However, 
arguments against constitutional comparativism do not necessarily take 
a conservative form as they reveal serious concerns for individuals on all 
sides of the political spectrum.200   
                                                 
196 Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 43.  Under this assertion, Breyer contends that surely 
one does not want to make a judge increase his or her ignorance of how things work in 
other places.  Id.  It is this light-hearted approach, perhaps, that causes a more serious 
stance by the opposition. 
197 See infra Part II.D.2. 
198 Supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
199 These agendas include areas such as gay rights, death penalty restrictions, abortion, 
and upholding affirmative action.  See supra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of these decisions.  
See also Anderson, supra note 28, at 45. (cautioning that the issue does not necessarily turn 
on the distinction of conservative versus liberal); supra note 188 (discussing the 
Constitutional Restoration Act brought by the conservative party). 
200 See Anderson, supra note 28, at 45 (noting that the debate is not necessarily a matter of 
“conservative” versus “liberal”).  Although constitutional comparativism has advanced the 
liberal agenda for the most part lately, it has an equal potential to aid the conservative 
agenda as well.  See Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the 
Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 67 (2004) [hereinafter Alford, Misusing International 
Sources].  Anderson points to individual rights such as property rights, establishment of 
religion, abortion, procedural due process, and free speech as areas that would be restricted 
if America followed the majority of the rest of the world.  Id.  Similarly, Professor Larsen 
also points out how following the rest of the world’s majority would result in the 
suppression of abortion or reproductive rights in America, noting that the Center for 
Reproductive Rights published statistics that the United States is 1 of only 6 countries in 
the world that allows abortion, without requiring a reason, until the point of viability.  See 
Larsen, supra note 53, at 1320  (quoting Center for Reproductive Rights, The World’s 
Abortion Laws (June 2004), http://www.reproductiverights.org/pub_fac_abortion_laws. 
html.  Furthermore, 187 out of the world’s 197 countries forbid abortion after 12 weeks 
gestation, and 141 of those countries require that the woman make some argument of a 
“good reason” to terminate her pregnancy.  Id.  Half of the countries of the world either 
forbid abortion altogether or only allow abortions to save the mother’s life or prevent 
physical injury, or in cases of rape or incest.  Id.  Similarly, the world consensus over 
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Roger P. Alford, for example, looks to constitutional theory.201  With 
this method, Alford analyzes constitutional comparativism in light of 
originalism, pragmatism, majoritarianism, and natural law theories of 
interpretation and concludes that serious problems exist no matter what 
theory one follows.202  In comparison, Professor Larsen takes a more 
moderate approach, and rejects only those decisions that engage in a 
moral fact-finding methodology.203  She argues that without further 
explanation or justification, moral fact-finding results in judicial 
subjectivity and contradictory rulings that are inconsistent with original 
intent or understanding and will not necessarily aid foreign policy or 
produce good results.204  Another commonly voiced criticism is that 
constitutional comparativism violates the Supremacy Clause205 by 
rendering foreign law source material for, but not subject to, the 
Constitution.206  A fourth argument, and perhaps the most significant, is 
                                                                                                             
homosexual rights potentially disapproves of the idea of special rights for homosexuals.  
See Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra, at 65-66.  For an exhaustive analysis of how 
constitutional comparativism of contemporary legal issues can both satisfy and scare 
almost every section of the political spectrum, see Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and 
our Constitution in International Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 23-26 (2005). 
201 See generally Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra note 58.  See Alford, Misusing 
International Sources, supra note 200, for Alford’s constitutional analysis applied to Roper v. 
Simmons. 
202 Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 200, at 2 (summarizing his 
conclusions made in his earlier article mentioned supra note 58).  Originalism does not 
work because it does not advance the objective of interpreting the Constitution based on 
the framers’ moral perceptions.  Id.  Natural law theory lends itself slightly, but falls short 
out of fear of judicial hegemony and substantive indeterminacy.  Id.  Majoritarianism puts 
too much emphasis into the legislature and national experience.  Id.  Finally, pragmatism is 
inconsistent with the comparative currents that espouse a summum bonum, or greatest 
good.  Id.; see also Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 43. 
203 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1302. 
204 Id.  These policy concerns emerge in various contexts in many scholarly writings.  
Notable are Alford’s concerns about “elevated use,” “haphazard use,” and “selective use” 
of international sources.  Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 200, at 61-69.  
Sanchez also expresses these concerns in his article, supra note 24. 
205 U.S. CONST. art. VI: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
Id. 
206 Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 200, at 57-58.  Alford finds that using 
foreign sources “fundamentally destabilizes the equilibrium of constitutional decision 
making. Using international law as an interpretive aid also ignores the Supremacy Clause, 
which renders all of our laws subject to, and not source material for, our Constitution.”  Id.  
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/9
2007] Constitutional Comparativism 1769 
that constitutional comparativism impedes national sovereignty and the 
democratic process by abrogating states’ rights.207  The basic difficulty 
here mirrors that of the countermajoritarian difficulty,208 where the Court 
uses the Constitution to thwart democratic will evident in legislative 
enactments.209  Finally, critics of judicial comparativism argue that it goes 
against the grain of America’s history, culture, and the framers’ intent.210 
Judicial internationalism has an expansive history in the United 
States.211  Although a few early criticisms, such as in Chisholm, are 
apparent, no consistent trend in opposition appears until the emergence 
                                                                                                             
The same problem exists when the Court interprets the Constitution in light of state 
legislation.  See id. at 61-62. 
207 Anderson, supra note 28, at 47-49; see also Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the 
Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.R. Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 72, 77 (2004) (testimony of Prof. 
Jeremy Rabkin, Cornell University) (arguing that comparative practice is “subversive of the 
whole concept of sovereignty”); Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra note 58, at 709-10 
(arguing that comparativism is inconsistent with political democracy); Alford, Misusing 
International Sources, supra note 200, at 58-61 (discussing the countermajoritarian difficulty). 
208 The countermajoritarian difficulty summates the concern that when a court declares a 
legislative or executive act unconstitutional, it thwarts the will of the people, undermining 
the values of the prevailing majority.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 17-21 (1962).  Constitutional review serves as a countermajoritarian check on the 
legislature and the executive.  Id. 
209 Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 200, at 58-59.  This is particularly 
troublesome in constitutional questions that invite judicial discretion.  Id.  If the political 
branches do not express international majoritarian values through the political branches, 
advocates resort to the courts.  Id. at 59.  But the only way for the courts to overcome 
sovereign values reflected in legislative enactments is through constitutional supremacy.  
Id.  When the Court invokes domestic majority values tests to interpret the Constitution, 
such as in the death penalty cases test of “national consensus,” the argument contends that 
international majoritarian values should have deference over domestic values.  Id. 
210 Judge O’Scannlain, What Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in the 
Interpretation of Domestic Law?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893 (2005).  Judge O’Scannlain 
provides the most comprehensive support for this argument, demonstrating the manner in 
which colonial and founding-era Americans consciously strove to develop a legal system 
that was tailored to the unique conditions of America at the time.  Id. at 1905.  He contends 
that these efforts “fostered a norm cautioning American jurists not to place reliance upon 
foreign legal authorities because they may be inapposite to American conditions.”  Id.  He 
gives two reasons why this applies in the modern day.  First, the intentions of the Framers 
hold a privileged position in American jurisprudence.  Id. at 1906.  Secondly, certain 
indelible differences such as culture, politics, and economics distinguish all countries from 
each other.  Id.; see also Neuman, supra note 58, at 86 (“the U.S. Constitution, unlike some 
twentieth-century constitutions, does not express a textual preference for alignment of its 
rights provisions with the positive law of the modern international human rights regime”); 
Sanchez, supra note 24, at 40.  At least one scholar has rejected this argument by 
distinguishing human rights law from other laws.  Neuman, supra note 58, at 87.  Neuman 
hints that individual rights are inherent in the individual and should not depend on 
independent characteristics of a countries’ legal system.  Id. 
211 See supra Part II.C. 
Zehnder: Constitutional Comparativism:  The Emerging Risk of Comparative L
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1770 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
of the most recent decisions involving individual liberties.212  On one 
hand, individual liberties in America are intimately tied to the Bill of 
Rights of the Constitution; on the other hand, human rights are inherent 
in the individual’s right, which begs an inquiry into standards applied to 
all individuals across the globe.213  Part III balances these two interests by 
analyzing the unique characteristics of the various Supreme Court 
decisions.214  
III.  A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARATIVISM 
The interactions America has had with foreign nations offers an 
important explanation for why opposition to judicial internationalism 
did not appear until recently.215  Constitutional comparativism is a 
product of, or at least made possible by, the phenomenon of 
globalization.216  The earliest decisions concentrated on instances where 
Americans interacted with people of other nations on a tangible level, 
invoking customary international law or treaties, whereas the recent 
flood of communication made possible by technological advancements 
has created greater transparency and accountability between nations on 
all levels.217  As mentioned, this can create problems when reconciling 
conflicting global human rights standards with American cultural 
values.218    
                                                 
212 See supra Part II.C.3. 
213 See supra note 210. 
214 See infra Part III. 
215 See supra Part II. 
216 See Koh, supra note 75 and accompanying text  (recognizing the impact that 
globalization has had in this area); see also Anderson, supra note 28 (“the [issue] depends 
less on pragmatism than on a view about globalization”); Fontana, supra note 68, at 568 
(“globalization plus advanced social science means that the data from law in action abroad 
might make comparative constitutional law a helpful source of constitutional fact”); 
Glensy, supra note 32, at 400 (“comparative analysis furthers the globalization of human 
rights”).  See generally Reem Bahdi, Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five 
Faces of International Law in Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 555, 591 (2002); 
Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 828 (1999); Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The 
Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 
TULSA L.J. 15, 33-34, 37-39 (1998). 
217 See supra Part II.B.1.  Organizations such as the United Nations did not exist, 
communication in general was meek, and a world consensus on issues such as individual 
liberties would have been difficult to find conclusively.  See Fontana, supra note 68, at 568 
(recognizing that globalization makes comparative analysis in constitutional questions both 
possible and desirable); see also supra note 146. 
218 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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When judges use international sources to interpret the Constitution, 
they risk undermining elements of America’s unique identity—
especially considering its democratic system.219  The most obvious 
elements of America’s identity stem from the cultural, political, and 
economic factors that are unique to America and differentiate its laws.220  
No matter where America’s legal system draws the line, it must reconcile 
two questions:  (1) how the particular method of comparativism acts to 
optimize the benefits of a globalized society; and (2) how these benefits 
are compatible with America’s identity.221   
Considering all cases invoking comparative analyses, the only cases 
that risk the slippery slope by posing a threat to democratic governance 
are those that address purely domestic constitutional issues and change 
the law without clear support at home.222  Thus, this analysis first looks 
at the need for distinguishing these cases from those that deal with 
international law or treaty concerns.223  Next, Part III analyzes the 
appropriateness of the three main types of constitutional comparativism 
and discusses the narrow circumstances where the moral fact-finding 
references cannot work.224 
A. Context Matters  
In analyzing constitutional comparativism, it is essential to 
understand the obvious difference between comparative references in a 
                                                 
219 See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text (discussing the concern that 
constitutional comparativism will undermine America’s national sovereignty and the 
democratic process, primarily through the countermajoritarian difficulty).  Perfect 
examples of this hostility are already apparent in the legislature’s introduction of the 
Feeney Resolution and the Constitutional Restoration Act of 2005 mentioned supra note 
188.  Justice Scalia’s dissent in Roper is further evidence of this notion.  See also supra note 
181. 
220 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.  Judge O’Scannlain used these differences 
to justify his opinion that Courts should refer to foreign law only in cases that involve 
treaties, international law disputes, or in areas where Congress provides for an 
international inquiry.  He wrote this with the assumption that these factors cannot be 
reconciled, and that it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the cultural contexts 
behind foreign laws.  However, this Note does not infer that the imposition of such a strict 
rule is necessary to avoid the cross-cultural or globalization problem.  Rather, this Note 
only maintains that these concerns should be the first and foremost while utilizing the 
benefits derived from a globalized world to the greatest extent. 
221 See infra note 221 and accompanying text.  This inquiry is an essential theme for 
advocates of constitutional comparativism.  See supra notes 148-51 (discussing the 
importance of utilizing the benefits of globalization with preserving our cultural values). 
222 See infra Part III.B. 
223 See infra Part III.A. 
224 See infra Parts III.B-III.C. 
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treaty or international law issue on the one hand, and domestic issues on 
the other.225  There is little dispute whether comparative inquiry is a 
desirable practice in issues involving treaties or matters bearing cross-
border consequences.226  Even Justice Scalia, passionately opposed to 
comparative judicial references, indicates that he is not opposed to 
references in treaty interpretation.227  Since the only cases leading to the 
slippery slope are those invoking constitutional comparativism in 
domestic law cases, it is essential to distinguish these cases from all 
others because different issues are at stake.228     
Cases involving cross-border issues have a subtle ability to create 
confusion with domestic law cases.229  One example is in Justice 
Ginsburg’s speech at The American Society of International Law.230  
Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg cited the standard set forth in The Paquete 
Habana, that “international law is part of our law . . . ,” and immediately 
turned to a discussion of the Dred Scott decision to say that opposition to 
comparative practice prolonged the institution of slavery in America.231  
Her comparison is problematic in that the criticisms of comparative law 
expressed by the author of the Dred Scott decision do not apply to the 
positive view of international law expressed in The Paquete Habana 
opinion.  The former dealt with a constitutional question on individual 
rights in America, whereas the latter dealt with an admiralty dispute 
between the United States and foreign nationals.232  The debate does not 
                                                 
225 See generally Larsen, supra note 53 (categorizing the various references to foreign law 
in order to better understand the issue at hand); Sanchez, supra note 24 (focusing on the 
differences between domestic constitutional issues and others). 
226 See Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 43.  Justice Scalia, making an important 
distinction, commented: 
I will use it in the interpretation of a treaty . . . in a recent case I 
dissented from the Court, . . . because this treaty had bee [sic] 
interpreted a certain way by ever [sic] foreign court of a country that 
was a signatory, and that way was reasonable . . . But I thought that 
the object of a treaty being to come up with a text that is the same for 
all the countries, we should defer to the views of other signatories, 
much as we defer to the views of agencies. 
Id. 
227 See supra note 43.  Scalia gives concessions that it is necessary to look to other 
country’s interpretations of treaties for the Court’s deliberations.  Scalia-Breyer Debate, 
supra note 43. 
228 See generally Sanchez, supra note 24. 
229 See infra notes 230-41 and accompanying text. 
230 See supra note 60. 
231 See Ginsburg Address, supra note 60, at 2.  See also supra notes 46-50 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the Court’s decision in The Paquete Habana.  For a 
discussion of Dred Scott, see supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. 
232 Supra notes 46-49, 110-12. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/9
2007] Constitutional Comparativism 1773 
question whether foreign law deserves deference when defining 
customary international law, but rather it questions whether global 
opinions should sway the constitutional interpretation absent a domestic 
legal standard.233  Nevertheless, Justice Ginsberg implied that foreign 
sources of law should have the same weight in domestic constitutional 
issues as they do in international law issues.234  As a result, the 
importance of accurately identifying the type of case before determining 
the appropriateness of a comparative analysis is essential because the 
only cases that pose a real threat to democracy in the United States are 
cases dealing with domestic Constitutional issues.235  Since not all 
comparative references in these cases pose a threat, they require further 
justification.236  
B. Justifications for Constitutional Comparativism  
After sifting through the relevant cases involving constitutional 
comparativism, a significantly small number used foreign sources of law 
to aid in exclusively domestic issues.237  Even more insignificant in 
number are those cases engaging in moral fact-finding, citing foreign law 
simply to support the Court’s value judgment.238  Thus, within the 
category of cases dealing exclusively with domestic issues, if one 
concedes that it is acceptable to cite to foreign laws as persuasive 
authority for their utility in ways such as empirical or expository aids, 
                                                 
233 See Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 200, at 61-64 for an in-depth 
discussion of the obvious problems inherent in reading the Constitution in light of 
international laws, let alone federal statutes. 
234 Supra notes 231-38.  This assertion goes subtly beyond the context of The Paquete 
Habana and Founders’ statements.  For an interesting discussion of The Paquete Habana, see 
generally Kathleen M. Kedian, Customary International Law and International Human Rights 
Litigation in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of The Paquete Habana, 40 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1395 (1999). 
235 See generally Larsen, supra note 53.  There is a separate debate as to whether the United 
States courts should look to the foreign laws in international legal disputes.  See Jonathan 
H. Adler, Sosa Justice, The Supreme Court Cuts Off International-law Suits—This Time, NRO 
(2004), http://www.nationalreview.com/adler/adler200407210842.asp (last visited Mar. 
31, 2007).  The debate surrounding this issue, however, does not center on whether the 
Court should use foreign sources, but rather which sources are appropriate for defining 
customary international law.  Id.  Some of the justices believe that customary international 
law changes, whereas other justices believe that it was frozen at the time of the 
Constitution’s framing.  Id. 
236 See infra Part III.B. 
237 See generally supra Part II.B (revealing that most cases using international law as 
persuasive authority for constitutional questions, which are few in number, have a short 
history in American jurisprudence).  What this does in effect is narrow the standards by 
which the Court may justify their comparative references in constitutional questions. 
238 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1299 (mentioning the recent emergence of these types of cases 
in constitutional questions). 
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only the handful of cases using a moral fact-finding approach remain in 
dispute.239  This Part analyzes expository and empirical inquiries to show 
that they pose no greater threat to the judicial system than any other 
persuasive source.240  It then analyzes the Court’s moral fact-finding 
decisions, arguing contrary to Professor Larsen’s position, that many of 
these have valid justifications.241 
1. Expository  
Expository references are more beneficial than detrimental to 
American jurisprudence.242  This is due to the fact that expository 
inquiries allow Americans to look to laws abroad in order to contrast and 
help explain laws in America.243  For example, when Chief Justice 
Rehnquist could not find either precedent or history to support the claim 
that the dilution of Congress’s votes under the Line Item Veto Act 
created standing, he was able to use this lack of precedent to show that 
the Constitution intended a much more restricted role of the courts than 
that of other nations.244  Expository practice is easily justifiable because 
none of the contemporary criticisms can reasonably show how it 
challenges America’s identity or when it maximizes the benefits derived 
from globalization.245 
From the perspective of America’s culture, politics, and economics, 
expository references to foreign legal standards merely distinguish 
American standards from the rest of the world.246  In other words, 
expository references positively highlight the uniqueness of America’s 
culture and legal system, and support its legitimacy by explaining its 
                                                 
239 See supra Part II.C.3 for a discussion of these decisions and supra notes 132-35 for a list 
of other similar decisions.  Recall that the Court’s empirical use looks at the practical effect 
of a law on a certain situation, and the Court’s expository references are those that use 
comparative legal materials to explain a domestic law in America.  Larsen, supra note 53, at 
1288. 
240 See infra Parts III.B.1-III.B.2. 
241 See infra Part III.B.3. 
242 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1299.  The basic argument that Larsen makes is that, after 
considering the many advantages that an expository inquiry can make, there really are no 
harms left that compare in scope.  Id.  She does not explicitly express this, but she integrates 
Justice Breyer’s argument that as long as the sources are only used as an expository aid, 
they are no different from any other persuasive source.  Id. 
243 See Breyer-Scalia Debate, supra note 43; see also Larsen, supra note 53, at 1316-17 
nn.145-46. 
244 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 814, 828 (1997) (finding that members of Congress lacked 
standing to challenge the dilution of their votes brought by the Line Item Veto Act); see 
supra note 54 (summarizing Raines). 
245 See infra notes 246-56. 
246 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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meaning in the context of other practices.247  The use of expository 
references as a threat to sovereignty should not be of concern either.248  
Rather, the most substantial concern for sovereignty comes from the fear 
that the Court will rule against America’s majority and these expository 
references are arguably not even true examples of constitutional 
comparativism because they add no additional meaning to the 
Constitution’s text.249  Finally, any argument about the framers’ intent is 
highly speculative because the framers frequently looked to foreign laws 
when drafting the Constitution.250   
Several policy based justifications exist that support expository 
references as well.251  First, expository references to foreign laws show 
comity to the laws of other nations by recognizing the legitimacy of those 
laws.252  Even given that the Court is not a venue to promote foreign 
policy, little harm can be done by recognizing the fact that other 
countries intelligently handle the same issue, especially when America is 
a model of democracy for the rest of the world to follow.253  This comity 
goes to the heart of many foreign policy considerations by simply 
recognizing the existence of different views, not necessarily for 
promoting a common judicial enterprise, but from a more general notion 
recognizing alternate views in a common democratic enterprise.254  The 
                                                 
247 See Larsen, supra note 53, at 1299.  This characteristic actually promotes the uniqueness 
of America’s culture and politics.  Id.  Thus, if one’s only concern is preserving America’s 
history and culture, expository references should not raise a flag, because they do not really 
result in any direct change to constitutional standards.  Id. 
248 See supra note 242-43 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 207-13 (discussing the countermajoritarian difficulty in international 
law).  The countermajoritarian difficulty arises when a court, generally the Supreme Court, 
interprets the Constitution in a way that invalidates multiple state laws.  Alford, Misusing 
International Sources, supra note 200, at 58-59.  If the foreign citation results in no real change 
in the Court’s conclusion, then no difficulty arises from that source.  Id. 
250 See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Framers’ 
intentions.  The result would be different if the foreign sources were a sole authority for the 
Court’s conclusion, but simple recognition of the sources of law abroad is consistent with 
the limited writings we have from the Framers.  Id. 
251 See infra notes 252-60. 
252 Although the Court does not follow these foreign laws, it is still able to show comity 
towards them by referencing them, recognizing their existence, and respectfully going the 
other way.  See Glensy, supra note 32, at 386.  Glensy, although not using the term “comity,” 
argues for it in effect by discussing how many nations have modeled their constitutions 
according to the United States Constitution, and that the United States should not hesitate 
to “learn from their children.”  Id.  By distinguishing the law in America from laws in other 
nations, the judiciary in effect learns from the laws of America’s children. 
253 Id. (noting that foreign countries across the globe draw their inspiration from the 
American model). 
254 See supra notes 252-59. 
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Court’s empirical references promote comity and foreign policy 
considerably more than expository references, while avoiding the 
slippery slope that risks circumventing the democratic process.255   
2. Empirical References 
Today, information technology allows the Court to observe the laws 
of other nations in real time and draw expository observations 
accordingly.256  Not only does an empirical inquiry into foreign practice 
provide greater utility than an expository one, but it is equally as 
justifiable in light of the criticisms against constitutional 
comparativism.257   
Because the history, politics, and culture that define America’s 
identity are different from many foreign nations, courts should approach 
empirical references with caution, and only after considerable research 
into the context of a particular law in a given culture.258  But this fact 
alone should not force America’s judicial system to sacrifice the benefits 
that empirical inquiries can provide.259  Contrary to the argument that 
constitutional comparativism results in subjective decisions, empirical 
research into foreign laws can eliminate a considerable amount of the 
speculation that often occurs in constitutional analysis by allowing the 
                                                 
255 See supra Part II.B.2. 
256 See Fontana, supra note 68, at 568.  Fontana asserts that “globalization plus advanced 
social science means that the data from law in action abroad might make comparative 
constitutional law a helpful source of constitutional fact.”  Id.  See supra note 55 and 
accompanying text for a general definition of the Court’s empirical references. 
257 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1299. 
258 Id. at 1300-01; see also Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 200, at 63-64. 
Alford cautions against value comparisons because of the 
values reflected in contemporary international laws are independent of 
those other interpretive categories. . . .  At most under this 
approach . . . international sources offer delocalized, independent 
moral and political arguments that serve as an index of the correctness 
of competing claims about essentially contestable concepts embodied 
in aspirational provisions of the Constitution. 
Id. 
259 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1300-01.  Larsen admits that there might be practical reasons 
to object to such evidence.  Id. at 1300.  As an example, she explains how judges may lack 
the expertise to properly research, understand, and evaluate foreign legal materials.  Id.  
But this threat alone should not bar all comparative inquiries.  Id.  She states: “from a 
constitutional theory perspective, looking to foreign legal systems to gather the factual 
information necessary to decide a particular constitutional question seems no less 
legitimate than looking to the consequences of a law adopted in one of the fifty states.”  Id.; 
see also Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative 
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 268-71 (2001). 
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courts to see how other democracies react to specific legislation.260  Also, 
as with the expository references, any argument against empirical 
references on the grounds that the practice is against the founders’ intent 
would be speculative given that the founders simply did not have the 
opportunity to examine the legal consequences of foreign laws in a 
timely fashion.261   
The greatest criticism is that empirical inquiries into foreign laws 
might circumvent the Supremacy Clause by interpreting the Constitution 
in light of those laws, but this is a weak argument.262  Regardless of the 
many theories for constitutional interpretation, the courts should always 
interpret laws of the United States according to the Constitution, and not 
the other way around.263  However, many of the Court’s constitutional 
tests, such as whether a law is “rationally related” or “necessary” in 
order to satisfy the Constitution, require the Court to engage in an 
empirical analysis.264  From an empirical viewpoint, no considerable 
difference exists between considering the operation of a law in a state, or 
in a foreign country, when the only goal is to understand the effect of the 
law.265  Thus, when constitutional tests use subjective standards for 
constitutional interpretation, such as defining an evolving standard of 
decency, foreign practice may prove useful without risking a 
compromise of America’s culture, values, or history.266  This inquiry into 
                                                 
260 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer 
looks to the laws of multiple European nations in order to “cast an empirical light on the 
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem.”  Id. 
261 See supra Part II.B (discussing the Founders’ intent); see also text accompanying notes 
78-81. 
262 See supra note 206 and accompanying text (comparing the similarities between 
comparative references and state law references in light of the Supremacy Clause). 
263 See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
264 See Larsen, supra note 53, at 1299-1300 (discussing various cases where the Court uses 
tests such as whether a law is “necessary” or “rationally related” to fulfill a goal). 
265 Fontana, supra note 68, at 570.  Fontana is a strong supporter of the idea that “[t]he 
past experience of other countries can help an American court determine if the legislative 
means used in a piece of legislation before the court really helps achieve the desired end.”  
Id.  Fontana asserts that observing experiences of other countries can help a court 
determine how successful a certain program will be.  Id.; see also Larsen, supra note 53, at 
1300. 
266 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1300.  A good example of and instance where looking abroad 
was more useful than any domestic legal source is in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997), where the Court looked at the effect the laws that accommodated physician assisted 
suicide in the Netherlands.  America had no precedents on assisted suicide, and an inquiry 
into the effects of the law in the Netherlands revealed considerable injustice.  Larsen, supra 
note 53, at 1300. 
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the nature of a particular test provides both an explanation and a 
framework for the cases involving moral fact-finding.267 
3. A Critique of Moral Fact-Finding Decisions 
As previously discussed, most comparative references can serve a 
highly useful purpose, whether they are expository or empirical, without 
endangering the history, culture, or values that make the American legal 
system unique.268  The most simple reasoning mirrors Justice Breyer’s 
argument—that international law merely constitutes another category of 
persuasive authority, such as a law review article or historical record.269  
Unfortunately, the reasoning is not as simple in cases engaging in moral 
fact-finding, where the Court searches for value choices reflected in 
foreign legal regimes.270  Nevertheless, the unique nature of the 
constitutional tests used in questions of individual rights partially 
justifies moral fact-finding in some decisions.271  
a.  A Unique Constitutional Test 
American conceptions of decency are dispositive for defining 
“evolving standards of decency,” but the Court uses a consensus 
standard to determine those standards.272  Although the Court must 
follow what it objectively determines is a national consensus, it is 
important to keep in mind that the individual rights that the Court 
defines are universal in nature.273  Thus, it makes sense that the recent 
decisions engaging in moral fact-finding look for a worldwide consensus 
                                                 
267 See infra Part III.C. 
268 See supra Parts III.A-III.C. 
269 See Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 43. 
270 Larsen, supra note 53, at 1293-94 (“The ‘moral fact-finding’ variant of the substantive 
use of comparative and international law is much more sweeping and perhaps more 
problematic than any of the [other] approaches.”). 
271 See infra Part III.B.3.a. 
272 See supra notes 131, 177 and accompanying text. 
273 For an opposing view of this assertion, see generally Alford, Misusing International 
Sources, supra note 200.  Alford argues that: 
In the death penalty context, the Court does not attach importance to 
international sources in undertaking a constitutional analysis because 
in adopting a majoritarian paradigm, whether a punishment is 
unusual or cruel should depend on a national consensus that gives 
expression to the sovereign will of the American people. Sovereign 
expressions of decency give voice to the constitutional standard, and 
while nonbinding treaty norms may echo those expressions, they are 
not part of the chorus. 
Id. at 60. 
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to confirm a consensus at home.274  Although these references 
communicate value judgments abroad, they serve an empirical purpose 
because they answer the Court’s test directly by showing evidence of 
evolving standards of decency of people worldwide.275  In this light, the 
very nature of the constitutional test justifies a comparative inquiry 
because of the empirical benefit it produces.276  For example, just as 
observing the application of a law abroad can show that it is “rationally 
related” to the fulfillment of a particular government objective, so can 
the mere fact that many other countries have accepted a human rights 
standard shed an empirical light on whether or not that standard 
constitutes an “evolved standard of decency.”277   
Furthermore, when used simply as confirmation, the moral fact-
finding approach avoids the many risks created by constitutional 
comparativism, and encapsulates many of the advantages.278  Just like 
empirical and expository references to international law, citations using 
the moral fact-finding approach promote comity by recognizing the 
existence of other foreign legal systems, and exalting those systems in 
their similarities to that of the United States.279  Similarly, observing a 
world consensus aids foreign policy by openly accepting similarities 
between the United States and other nations.280  It also moves toward the 
                                                 
274 This is precisely what Justice Kennedy argued in Roper v. Simmons—that the opinion 
of the world community provides “respected and significant confirmation for the Court’s 
determination.”  125 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2005).  Whether the world community actually offers 
confirmation, as opposed to independent justification, in this specific case is subject to 
debate.  See supra note 177 and accompanying text.  As compared to its predecessor cases, 
the national consensus shown in Roper was at best not obvious, and was arguably not 
existent at all.  See supra note 177 for a discussion of the controversy over the existence of a 
true national consensus. 
275 See supra note 130.  However, this is not to mean that whatever insight the world may 
provide may rank above domestic majoritarian judgments.  See Alford, Misusing 
International Sources, supra note 200, at 58 (“To the extent that value judgments are a source 
of constitutional understandings of community standards, in the hierarchical ranking of 
relative values domestic majoritarian judgments should hold sway over international 
majoritarian values”). 
276 See generally Blum, supra note 138 (supporting the use of comparativism as an 
empirical guide). 
277 See Larsen, supra note 53, at 1299-1300 (discussing various cases where the Court uses 
tests such as whether a law is “necessary” or “rationally related” to fulfill a goal). 
278 Shirley S. Abrahamson and Michael J. Fischer,  All the World’s a Courtroom: Judging in 
the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 285 (1997) (“[T]he risks inherent in exploring 
different legal systems are risks that American lawyers and state court judges take every 
day.”). 
279 See Glensy, supra note 32, at 392-93. 
280 See Larsen, supra note 53, at 1317-18.  Larsen purports that many scholars believe that 
the Court’s embrace of comparative or international law norms has the potential of helping 
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support of a world consensus on human rights issues, a task that the 
United States has previously attempted.281  Finally, perhaps the most 
simple justification is that the requirement of a national consensus itself 
necessitates a survey of value judgments within the United States.282  
Thus, a world consensus simply provides confirmation of already 
existing principles of law and fact within the United States that are no 
different from any other non-binding source.283 
The nature of a constitutional test seeking a national consensus 
evincing “evolving standards of decency” considerably reduces the risks 
involved with constitutional comparativism as well.284  Regardless of the 
constitutional theory one adheres to, the fact that these foreign references 
directly further the constitutional test as persuasive authority by adding 
substance to a national consensus makes them no different from any 
other persuasive source.285  For this reason, any risk that a judge will cite 
to an international source of law haphazardly or selectively is no greater 
than the risk that a judge will cite to any other persuasive texts with the 
same inaccuracies.286  Furthermore, this provides no contradiction to the 
limited documents concerning our founders’ intent.287  Due to concerns 
over democracy and states’ rights, however, this is only the case if the 
Court uses the global consensus as it would any other persuasive source:  
as an aid to understand and confirm a fair application of legally binding 
principles of law.288  The most recent decision of Roper v. Simmons 
highlights this difficulty because the decision arguably went beyond 
mere confirmation; it acted as a constitutional tiebreaker.289   
                                                                                                             
foreign policy where the political branches have refused fully to embrace international 
human rights norms.  Id. 
281 Such as with the U.S. involvement in drafting the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966.  See supra note 183. 
282 See supra note 177 and accompanying text (showing the close national consensus in 
Roper v. Simmons). 
283 Supra notes 279-88 and accompanying text. 
284 Infra notes 285-94 and accompanying text.  For example, by using a subjective test to 
interpret the Constitution, the Court is already subject to many risks that naturally 
accompany subjective tests.  Introducing foreign legal sources into the mix will not do 
anything to influence the intensity of this risk. 
285 See Justice Breyer’s arguments in the Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra notes 43, 186, 196 and 
accompanying text. 
286 See Justice Breyer’s arguments in the Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 196 and 
accompanying text.  See also Abrahamson, supra note 278, at 285. 
287 See supra Part II.D.2. 
288 See supra note 33. 
289 See infra Part III.3.b. 
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b. Foreign Law as a Constitutional Tiebreaker 
Decisions that engage in moral fact-finding provide confirmation of 
a true national consensus, but may threaten democracy if the foreign 
sources receive greater weight than the national consensus.290  It is 
acceptable to conclusively find that a consensus exists in America and 
then provide support with a similar consensus worldwide.  However, it 
is dangerous for the Court to use the presence of a global consensus to 
justify changing the Constitution’s scope when a national consensus 
lacks finality.291  For the first time ever, the Roper majority opinion 
included the states that have banned the death penalty altogether in 
order to make the number of states sanctioning juvenile death penalty 
appear less significant.292  This Court further embellished its skewed 
statistics when it completely disregarded the fact that the number of jury 
verdicts imposing juvenile death sentences has actually increased since 
Stanford last challenged and found the juvenile death penalty 
constitutional.293   
The lack of a national consensus creates great speculation behind the 
Court’s true motivation for citing foreign law, especially because the 
Court in the past has required overwhelming proof of a true national 
consensus.294  The Court has little, if any, justification to disregard the 
traditional requirement of an overwhelming national consensus in order 
                                                 
290 See supra Part III.3.a. 
291 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.  Justice Breyer explained that particularly 
when dealing with issues of general principles such as “liberty” or determinations of “cruel 
and unusual punishment,” these concepts have similar application and understandings in 
many countries around the world.  Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 196.  Breyer admits that 
he does not try to figure out the meaning of particular words in the Constitution such as 
“cruel and unusual”; he just tries to deal with their application, “[a]nd it isn’t some arcane 
matter of contract law, where a different legal system might have given the same words 
totally different application . . . you’re trying to get a picture how other people have dealt 
with it.”  Id. 
292 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1192-94 (2005). 
293 Id. at 1221 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
294 Id. at 1218.  “Our previous cases have required overwhelming opposition to a 
challenged practice, generally over a long period of time.”  Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977)).  Likewise, Justice O’Connor pointed this out in her separate 
dissent: 
[T]he extraordinary wave of legislative action leading up to our 
decision in Atkins provided strong evidence that the country truly had 
set itself against capital punishment of the mentally retarded. Here, by 
contrast, the halting pace of change gives reason for pause. 
Id. at 1211 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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to broaden the scope of individual rights under the Constitution.295  
Regardless of this fact, the Court turned to the strong international 
consensus in order to supplement the lack of a consensus at home.296  
The international consensus thus acted as a tiebreaker where the Court 
could not conclusively show a national consensus in its favor.297  This 
precedent travels too far down the slippery slope toward threatening a 
democratic legal system.298  
By utilizing an international consensus where no clear national 
consensus existed, the Court imposed its own value judgment on the 
Constitution.299  The countermajoritarian difficulty does not justify this 
adequately because the Court did not find conclusive justification for its 
decision under the Constitutional test:  a national consensus indicating 
evolving standards of decency.300  Countermajoritarian theory only 
works when the Constitution itself contradicts the will of the people. 301  
For this reason, the decision sends the Court down a slippery slope that 
risks thwarting the democratic will in the United States, because the 
international consensus is the only clear justification supporting the 
Court’s decision.302  By using the international consensus as a tiebreaker, 
it had a conclusive effect on the Court’s decision.303  Not only does it 
threaten democracy, it is a harmful precedent in Constitutional decision-
making—namely, the decision contradicts the United States’ history and 
tradition of providing deference to states’ rights.304  Finally, policy 
concerns such as the risk of haphazardly choosing sources, or selectively 
                                                 
295 In its ruling, the Court made it considerably easier to impose its independent value 
judgment on the Constitution by ignoring the past requirement of an overwhelming 
consensus.  See Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 200, at 59. 
296 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
297 Supra note 177. 
298 See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (discussing the countermajoritarian 
difficulty). 
299 See Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 200, at 59. 
300 See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.  The countermajoritarian difficulty only 
works when the Constitution itself contradicts the will of the people.  Thus, if the only solid 
basis for interpreting the Constitution a certain way is because of foreign laws, the Court is 
trumping the democratic will with these foreign laws. 
302 See supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing the Supremacy Clause). 
303 See Anderson, supra note 28, at 47. 
304 See id. at 1 (criticizing the Roper opinion). 
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choosing sources, become vital where the Court uses persuasive 
authority to bind the Constitution.305 
After weighing the risks and benefits of constitutional 
comparativism among the various types of cases, the only cases that 
represent a true threat to democracy are the few that involve purely 
domestic issues and cite to foreign law simply to support the Court 
majority’s independent value judgment, whereas the majority of the 
references are no different from any other persuasive source.  Although 
relatively insignificant in number, the Court needs to utilize a 
methodology to avoid the slippery slope apparent in cases like Roper.306 
IV.  A PROPOSED APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARATIVISM 
The line between cases that may potentially cause harm or good by 
constitutional comparativism is thin, and the numerous arguments 
surrounding this issue often disregard it.307  Many proponents of 
constitutional comparativism fail to see any problem with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Roper, whereas opponents are equally as reluctant to 
see the benefits that constitutional comparativism can provide.308  The 
main difficulty in developing a test or Model Judicial Reasoning for 
policing these cases is that the comparative analysis is generally not the 
object of a particular case’s controversy, and it is not a constitutional 
theory.309  Thus, Model Judicial Reasoning must administer the 
implementation of comparative analysis across all cases, rather than 
establish a process for analyzing a particular issue at the heart of a case’s 
controversy.  In most Court decisions, references to international legal 
sources appear trivial and have no substantive effect on the Court’s 
decision, or as Justice Scalia asserts, are simply “meaningless dicta.”310  
That is, of course, until decisions like Roper and Lawrence.  For example, 
Roper was the first individual rights case in Court history to devote an 
entire section of the opinion to comparative analysis, and in both cases, 
                                                 
305 For a discussion about the risks of using “elevated use,” “haphazard use,” and 
“selective use” of international sources, see Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra 
note 200, at 61-69.  Sanchez also iterates these concerns in his article supra note 24. 
306 See infra Part IV. 
307 See supra Part III.A for two examples where this line is completely disregarded. 
308 See supra Part III. 
309 See Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra note 58, at 641 (“Comparativism is not a 
constitutional theory; it is a methodology that is employed depending on a judge’s 
particular theory.”). 
310 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the comparative analysis served as an essential authority justifying the 
Court’s decision without a clear domestic standard.311   
Another difficulty in developing a test or model reasoning for these 
decisions is that the issue is three-dimensional.  This means that the 
appropriateness of using a comparative analysis not only depends on the 
type of case and the constitutional standard or test, but also the role, 
positive or negative, that foreign law analysis plays.312  For example, the 
dissent in Roper probably would have been more reluctant to criticize the 
majority’s comparative analysis if it merely distinguished foreign laws 
from United States domestic law and found them contrary to it.  This 
Part proposes Model Judicial Reasoning that provides clarity to the issue 
of constitutional comparativism and concludes with a solution to avoid 
the specific problem posed in Roper.   
A. Model Reasoning for Judicial Internationalism 
All courts should consider three major inquiries before utilizing 
foreign sources of law in their decision-making:  
(1)  Does the issue involve a question over a treaty or 
international law, or is it a domestic constitutional 
question? 
(2) If it is a domestic constitutional law issue, does the court 
intend to use it to support its value judgment in a moral 
fact-finding analysis, or does it intend to use the source as 
an expository or empirical aid? 
(3) If the issue requires a moral fact-finding approach, does it 
merely support the results of a constitutional test, or does 
it supplement the test where a local inquiry is unclear? 
The most common and simple mistake that people in the legal 
community make is in failing to distinguish the issue of the case at 
hand.313  Thus, the first and most essential step in determining whether a 
comparative analysis is appropriate is to determine whether the case 
concerns a treaty, an issue of international law, or whether it involves 
purely domestic law with purely domestic consequences.  As Justice 
                                                 
311 See supra Part II.C.3.a for a discussion of the Lawrence decision, and supra Part II.C.3.b 
for a discussion of the decision in Roper. 
312 See supra note 58 and accompanying text for an explanation of positive and negative 
analyses. 
313 See supra Part IV.A. 
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Ginsburg demonstrated in her speech to the American Society of 
International Law, criticisms of some forms of comparative judicial 
reasoning do not necessarily apply across the board.314  For example, not 
even Justice Scalia would agree with the assertion that citing foreign 
sources in a treaty issue “threatens America’s sovereignty and violates 
the Supremacy Clause.”  Similarly, few would argue that the Court 
should view all constitutional questions in light of foreign laws simply 
because the practice is acceptable in treaty interpretation.  The 
implications behind using comparative reasoning in situations involving 
treaties and international law are not comparable on a critical level to the 
implications behind comparative references in purely domestic issues.315  
If determined that a case involves purely domestic issues, the next step is 
to determine what the Court attempts to do with its reference to foreign 
sources.   
The goal of this step and subsequent steps is to ensure that the 
foreign legal sources are no more binding than other forms of persuasive 
authority.  Justice Scalia wrote that the Court should either admit to 
reconsidering all matters of individual freedom under the Constitution 
in light of the views of foreigners, or stop using foreign views as part of 
the Court’s reasoned basis of its decisions altogether.316  However, this 
view is too exclusionary.  If the Court uses a comparative analysis as an 
expository aid, it is acceptable because it merely helps explain the law in 
America.  Likewise, if the Court intends to reference foreign law as an 
empirical aid, then it is also acceptable because it provides useful 
information much like scientific research or sociology studies.  These 
references are equal to any other source of persuasive authority and 
should receive equal treatment.  Next, if the Court wishes to use foreign 
law simply to confirm the Court’s individual value judgment, it should 
refrain from doing so absent special circumstances. 
In particular, the Court should avoid using international references 
as independent grounds to reach a particular value judgment, including 
instances such as in Roper where foreign laws provided the Court with a 
                                                 
314 See supra Part IV.A. 
315 See supra Part IV.A (discussing confusions between cases invoking comparative 
analysis in domestic issues versus cases involving treaty or international law questions). 
316 Justice Scalia stated: 
The Court should either profess its willingness to reconsider all these 
matters in light of the views of foreigners, or else it should cease 
putting forth foreigners’ views as part of the reasoned basis of its 
decisions. To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, 
and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry. 
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1228 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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last vote, or a tiebreaker.  The only time the Court should proceed with 
referencing foreign sources to confirm a value judgment is when the 
respective constitutional test is such that it requires a value judgment of 
some kind, and the foreign law will help understand the application of 
that test.  For example, if the test is to determine the existence of a 
national consensus for or against a particular issue, the court may 
compare evidence of a national consensus at home to similar evidence 
abroad in order to assure that its conclusion based on that evidence is as 
accurate as possible.  If a comparative analysis confirms the result of a 
constitutional test that is conclusive by American legal standards, or if it 
is simply used to distinguish the test, then it remains no different from 
other forms of persuasive authority and should be acceptable.317   
By using this methodology, the Court will be able to utilize the 
advantages provided by the technological advances in communication.  
It weakens the effect and overall utility that these sources can provide, 
but this is intentional because it defends against the temptation to use 
these sources selectively in order to justify a judge’s personal position on 
an issue that is less than clear by domestic standards.318  More 
technically, this weakened effect assures that international legal trends 
remain persuasive authority and nothing more.     
B. The Real Problem 
In reality, only a narrow line of cases contribute to the slippery slope 
of constitutional comparativism.  This is because the constitutional test 
searching for evolving standards of decency begs for an inquiry into the 
opinions of the rest of the world—especially concerning issues such as 
human rights that span all borders, and in light of the increased 
                                                 
317 It is important to note that even the majority opinion of Roper did not use its foreign 
references as confirmation.  Id. at 1193 (majority opinion).  In fact, the majority admitted 
that the consensus was less conclusive and less dramatic, and then relied on the slow 
change that was occurring in the United States.  Id.  The Court never equated this change 
with a national consensus, but instead shifted the burden immediately in the next 
paragraph by saying that the dissent could not find a consensus for a juvenile death 
penalty.  Id. at 1194.  When shifting its focus to the international consensus, the Court 
further admitted that it only adds confirmation to the Court’s decision that a juvenile death 
penalty violates the Eighth Amendment, not that it confirms a consensus at home.  Id. at 
1198. 
318 Roger Alford has expressed concern that this “effort to place our jurisprudence in its 
international context underscores the degree to which the Roper paradigm might open for 
reconsideration constitutional rights based on their disequilibrium with international 
values.”  Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 200, at 3; see also Blum, supra note 
138, at 197 (“Unconstrained use of comparative materials can lead to abuse and misuse.”). 
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knowledge Americans possess about the rest of the world.319  The test is 
terribly ambiguous, as the national consensus surrounding juvenile 
death penalty demonstrates, because a national consensus is not always 
clear.320  The logical treatment of an unclear consensus should be to 
simply wait until it becomes clear and then change the law.  Nonetheless, 
as Roper v. Simmons demonstrates, it is rather easy to convince a court’s 
majority to change the law with an unclear national consensus when the 
rest of the world is overwhelmingly clear.  Two plausible solutions exist: 
either the Court must exercise control by adopting a methodology 
similar to the one mentioned above, or change its test to provide a 
clearer, more objective standard. 
By adopting the Model Judicial Reasoning, the Court will avoid the 
slippery slope that is terribly close to threatening America’s democratic 
ideals.  Furthermore, although this methodology reduces foreign sources 
of authority to the same level as any other form of persuasive authority, 
it does not mean that these citations are wholly meaningless.  The 
methodology encourages negative comparative inquiries in all cases, and 
positive inquiries in almost all cases.  This helps U.S. foreign policy by 
providing comity to the laws of other nations, while making the United 
States more accountable and transparent to the rest of the world.  
Adopting a more objective standard will likely accomplish this goal. 
In the past, the Court never required an overwhelming national 
consensus in the letter of its test; it only required one in practice.  The 
Court should incorporate “overwhelming” into the letter of its test in 
order to set a clear policy that avoids a change in constitutional 
standards when no real change in American standards of decency exist.  
Furthermore, the Court should develop a standard to define 
overwhelming—which should be defined by a decline of thirty percent 
of the states that originally sanctioned juvenile death penalty since its 
inception.  Thus, if twenty states allowed juvenile death penalty at its 
inception, an overwhelming consensus against it would trigger once that 
number dropped to twelve.  Regardless of whether the Court chooses a 
new methodology, or amends its test for individual rights under the 
Constitution, it will require a considerable amount of compromise on 
both ends of the spectrum. 
                                                 
319 See supra Part IV. 
320 See supra note 177. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Judicial internationalism has an expansive history in the United 
States spanning from the nation’s birth to the present.  Except for a few 
cases, criticisms of judicial internationalism have occurred almost 
exclusively in the last twenty years.  America’s global hegemony 
following World War I provides some explanation for this timing.  More 
importantly the increase in democracies following the two World Wars 
and globalization generally have contributed to the increase in 
interaction with other nations by providing common goals abroad, and 
easing the flow of communication respectively.  As a result, not only are 
there more comparative references, but the references span more issues 
than in the past.  Where early references settled mainly on issues 
involving treaties and cross-border issues, the more recent decisions 
engage in constitutional questions, especially in the area of human 
rights.  While many critics see this as a threat to democracy, others see it 
as an opportunity to promote comity to other nations by referencing 
foreign law as persuasive authority. Still, the most recent decisions push 
the notion of persuasive authority by acting as a tiebreaker where issues 
are not clear by domestic American standards.  The result is a slippery 
slope that moves towards thwarting the democratic will of Americans 
where foreign law is the only clear confirmation of the Court’s 
individual value judgment.  When singled out, very few of the 
individual rights cases that cite to foreign law simply to confirm the 
Court’s value judgment represent any threat to democracy in the United 
States, whereas the majority of those references are no different from any 
other persuasive authority.  The Court needs a methodology in order to 
avoid the few situations where the rest of the world may trump the 
democratic system.  Most importantly, the Court needs to exercise 
control and resist that temptation.  Although comity to other nations is 
important, comity to American citizens is absolute. 
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